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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies degree of competitiveness in the airline industry inferred by investigation 
of market structure. Chapter 2 documents empirical evidence that endogenous sunk costs 
investments in advertising and in expanding route network play a crucial role in determining 
equilibrium market structure and, that the industry is a natural oligopoly. In chapter 3 we 
perform an empirical analysis of market structure beyond the bounds approach, to explain 
firm numbers and market share asymmetry for city pair markets. In addition, splitting firms 
into two types, leaders and non-leaders, it is proposed evidence that nature of competition 
depends on presence of leader airlines. In particular, there is evidence consistent with 
learning; that is, non-leaders infer profitability of routes from the number and identity of 
leaders. Chapter 4 proposes two econometric models of entry to analyze market sharing 
agreements.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND DATASET 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce objectives and a brief outline of the three original 
chapters of the dissertation, as well as to introduce some key features and definitions of the 
assembled dataset which, will be useful to understand econometric analysis performed in 
subsequent chapters.  
This dissertation is broadly motivated by how markets work and how firms behave, 
specifically in the U.S. airline industry. The underlying analytical theme of Chapters 2 and 3 
is to infer from market concentration competitive process at work. Very intriguingly, from 
the observed market structure we can draw back to competitive forces which have generated 
the structure we actually observe. This theme is not just of academic interest, but it also 
brings prominent relevance for competition policy. Chapter 4 attempts to gain insights on 
entry decisions of major firms into airline city pairs. Specific research question refers to 
whether airlines deliberately prevent competition head-to-head within city pair markets. The 
nature of the addressed research questions suggests employing empirical methods.  
To answer the questions posed, I construct a novel dataset involving a cross-section 
sample of 661 airline city pair markets, with information on several market characteristics for 
each route including market size and identities of airlines operating in each route market with 
individual market shares, used to compute various measures of concentration (Hirshman-
Herfindahl index and firm-concentration ratios). Most of this IO literature on airlines 
generally neglects to endogenize market structure as well as to study its competitive forces 
(exceptions are Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). Also, the literature largely 
ignores the implications that vertical product differentiation can have on market structure. 
The main body of this dissertation consists of three empirical Chapters (2, 3 and 4) on 
market structure and competitive conduct in airline markets; each chapter uses a different 
empirical strategy. Chapter 2 makes use of the bounds methodology to empirically 
investigate the relationship between market size and market structure. The econometric 
analysis is based on the theoretical framework developed by Sutton (1991), Shaked and 
Sutton (1983) and complemented by more recent theory work, (Vasconcelos 2006). 
Fundamentally, the chapter proposes an empirical test on various predictions of the 
endogenous sunk costs model (ESC). The results point to evidence that equilibrium market 
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structure is driven by endogenous sunk costs competition; in particular, it appears that airlines 
escalate investments in advertising as well as investments for expanding route structure. The 
number of routes serviced out of the end points of a given city pair can enhance market 
shares within the given route market. Chapter 3 deduces the nature of competition from 
empirically analysing firm numbers and market share asymmetry, as well as the competitive 
effects between different types of firms. Using our novel data set, we extend the literature on 
empirical market structure in various ways. First, we complement the bounds approach by 
investigating structure above the lower bound and then, unlike previous literature on 
empirical models of market structure and entry, we study determinants of firm size inequality. 
The literature on empirical market structure is also extended by analysing nature of 
competition between different types of firms (e.g. Shaumans and Verboven (2008)). Chapter 
4 assesses collusion in terms of territory allocation. To this goal, we estimate two alternative 
econometric models of entry. Results do suggest some evidence consistent with the 
possibility of collusion on market (route) allocation. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some elements of 
the database. The appendix lists the cities involved in the route markets. 
 
1.2 Dataset 
Coverage of the Sample 
The econometric analysis of the dissertation focuses on a newly assembled dataset about U.S. 
airline city pairs. Market shares and concentration data are for 2006 collected from the US 
Transportation Bureau (BTS); whilst, demographic variables (population) refer to year 2000 
obtained from US census.  
Belobaba (2010) reports that US airline industry profits in 2006-2007 are positive 
after five year period, 2001-2005, of losses accruing to forty billions US dollar; the years 
2008-2009 brings further negative profits. 
The dataset contains 661 city pair markets involving 58 cities, of which 25 are from 
the 50 largest U.S. cities; seventeen cities in the dataset are in the largest top twenty. In 
addition, our dataset covers 66% of the revenue passenger boardings for all US large hub 
airports. The goal in assembling this dataset has been to obtain a sample of city pair markets 
reasonably representative of the whole industry. To this end, we followed the following 
criteria: i) to include many major airports with substantial air transport traffic; ii) to include 
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also several medium sized and small cities, in order to obtain a sample of route markets with 
wide variation in population size.  
The focus is on domestic routes similarly to IO literature on the US airline industry. 
 
Airports/Cities 
The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) defines large hub as “a commercial service 
airport that has at least one per cent of the passenger boardings”. In this dissertation we 
adhere to such legal/institutional definition for identifying the large hub cities (containing at 
least one hub airport). 
Table 1 provides distribution of cities’ population in our dataset, whilst Table 2 gives 
the distribution of large hub cities’ population. The concept of city adopted throughout this 
dissertation refers narrowly to the urban area rather than the Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA). 
 
Table 1 – Cities by population size 
Population range                          # Cities 
 
0 - 100.000 
  
16 
100.001 - 500.000  23 
500.001 - 1.000.000  10 
> 1.000.000    9 
    
Total          58 
 
Table 2 – Cities containing large Hub airports 
by Population size 
Population range               # Large Hub 
   
100.001 - 500.000    3 
500.001 - 1.000.000    5 
> 1.000.000    8 
    
Total          16 
 
We define as tourist cities as those located in California and Florida plus two tourist 
snow and ski resorts, Aspen and Colorado Springs, which are both located in Colorado. A 
strategy for identifying tourist city pairs could be that of collecting data on number of hotels 
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in each city and setting up an arbitrary threshold of them, in order to classify the routes as 
either tourist or not. In contrast, the criterion followed in this paper is simpler without the 
need of further data. Essentially, it rests on the observation that U.S.A. do not have art cities 
as often it occurs in Europe, but rather tourism is motivated mainly by reaching seaside 
resorts which are located prominently in California and Florida. In the empirical models it is 
introduced a dummy equal to 1 for all markets with at least one end point city located either 
in California or Florida, plus the other two locations, Aspen and Colorado Springs. The 
criterion of classifying as tourist airline markets those having at least one end point in either 
California or Florida is also used in Berry (1992).  
 
Airlines 
The dataset contains 58 airlines (by coincidence these are as many as the cities) of which 10 
are low cost (AirTran, Allegiant Air, Frontier Airlines, Horizon Air, JetBlue, Midwest, 
Southwest, Spirit Air, Sun, USA3000). A distinction used in the analysis of Chapters 2, 3 and 
4 of this dissertation is between leader airlines and non-leaders in base of number of routes 
serviced within our data set. Table 3 below illustrates how the seven leaders serviced a 
number of routes equal to 95% of the number of those routes operated by the other fifty-one 
airlines in the dataset. In addition, each leader services on average 91 city pairs, while each 
non-leader on average offers only 13 routes.  Only one low cost airline is classified as leader, 
Southwest.  
 
Table 3 – Number of Routes serviced by 
leaders and non-leaders 
# Routes 
 
Non-Leaders                                 666 
 
American                    136 
Delta Airlines             113 
Southwest                   107 
Continental                  77 
US Airways                 69 
United Airlines            68 
Northwest                    65 
 
Leaders                                          635 
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A motivation for this distinction relies on following reasoning. Airlines servicing a 
wider route structure may obtain demand and cost advantages; as a result, vertical product 
differentiation may arise between those firms providing a large network of routes and those 
offering a handful of routes. 
 
Routes 
The 58 cities contained in our dataset produce a sample of 661 city pair markets with at least 
one airline possessing positive market shares. The dataset involves non-stop airline markets. 
This can create some limitations when dealing with the U.S. airline industry, as most airlines 
on this market operate hub-and-spoke networks. Consequently, entry and frequency decisions 
on spoke-hub markets are determined by the expected demand on spoke-hub-spoke markets. 
This limitation is mitigated by introducing dummies for large hubs; in fact, in Chapters 3 and 
4 the empirical analysis of market structure and entry decisions is controlled for large hub 
airports. 
Consistently with previous literature about the industrial organization in the airline 
industry, we define the relevant market at route level, and precisely the city pair markets are 
non-directional (e.g. Los Angeles – Miami is integrated with Miami – Los Angeles) since 
market shares are determined not directionally. We can mention several examples of 
contributions where economic investigation focuses on single routes each of them treated as a 
separate market1. In support of this, competition authorities normally pursue investigations 
considering the relevant market at route level. In addition, Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2010) 
develop a market definition methodology for the airline industry, concluding that the most 
appropriate market definition is at route level.  
Concentration is measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. For robustness 
purposes concentration ratios, C1, C2 and C4, are tried in formal analysis of subsequent 
chapters. 
Appendix 
List of Airlines 
Delta Airlines, AirTran, Atlantic, Champion, Continent, US Airways, Shuttle, PSA, Pace, 
Miami Air, Mesa, Freedom, Continental, Spirit Airlines, Midwest, Air, Casino, Chautauqua, 
                                                          
1For example, Aguirregabiria and Chun-Yu Ho (2010), Berry (1992), Borenstein (1989), Brander and Zhang 
(1990), Evans, Froeb and Warden (1993), Evans and Kessides (1993) (where actually two different market 
definitions are used, at route and airport level), Marin (1995), Mazzeo (2003), Charles and Seabright 
(2001),Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004), Neven, Lars-Hendrik Roller, and Zhentang Zhang (2006), 
Lederman (2007, 2008). 
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United Airlines, Sky king, Republic, American, America, Mesaba, Northwest, ATA, JetBlue, 
Commute Airlines, Express Jet, Piedmont, Southwest, Trans, North, Alaska, Boston, Frontier, 
SkyWest, Allegiant, USA Jet, Horizon Air, World, Pinnacle, Ryan, Colgan, Go Jet, 
USA3000, Executive, Gulfstream, Victory, Hawaiian, Net jets. 
 
List of cities with the associated States    
City      State 
Aberdeen Maryland 
Albany New York 
Alexandria Louisiana 
Allentown Pennsylvania 
Asheville North Carolina 
Aspen Colorado 
Atlanta Georgia 
Augusta Maine 
Austin Texas 
Baton Rouge Louisiana 
Bismarck North Dakota 
Boise Idaho 
Boston Massachusetts 
Buffalo New York 
Charlotte North Carolina 
Chicago Illinois 
Cincinnati Ohio 
Colorado Springs Colorado 
Columbia South Carolina 
Columbus Ohio 
Dallas Texas 
Des Moines Iowa 
Detroit Michigan 
Florence South Carolina 
Fort Lauderdale Florida 
Green Bay Wisconsin 
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Houston Texas 
Ithaca New York 
Jacksonville Florida 
Kansas City Missouri 
Little Rock Arkansas 
Long Beach California 
Los Angeles California 
Madison Wisconsin 
Memphis Tennessee 
Miami Florida 
New Orleans Louisiana 
New York New York 
Ontario New York 
Palm Springs California 
Philadelphia Pennsylvania 
Pierre South Dakota 
Port Angeles Washington 
Portland Oregon 
Providence Rhode Island 
Richmond Virginia 
Sacramento California 
San Antonio Texas 
San Diego California 
San Francisco California 
San Jose California 
Santa Barbara California 
Spokane Washington  
Tallahassee Florida 
Washington District of Columbia 
Waterloo Iowa 
West Palm Beach Florida 
Yuma Arizona 
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CHAPTER 2 
NON-FRAGMENTATION, MONOPOLY OUTCOMES AND 
NATURAL OLIGOPOLY: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
 
Abstract: Most of the industrial organization literature on airlines has neglected competitive 
forces which have generated industrial market structure. In addition, the majority of 
competition models of this literature assume homogeneous products or at most symmetric 
product differentiation. This paper, in contrast to previous work, shows the underlying 
competitive process in the airline industry inferred by investigation of market structure, as 
well as how product differentiation drives concentration. The empirical analysis is grounded 
on Sutton (1983, 1991) and Vasconcelos (2006) endogenous sunk costs model, finding 
evidence consistent with the fact that, the structure of airline city pair markets is mainly 
driven by competition in quality through endogenous sunk costs – namely, route structure 
and advertising. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper has the purpose to uncover competitive mechanisms at work in the airline industry 
which can be revealed by investigating structure. We do this by testing the endogenous sunk 
costs model developed by Sutton (1991) and complemented by Vasconcelos (2006). 
Estimation of the lower bound and the upper bound to concentration is performed for a 
sample of airline city pair markets.  
A main motivation of this paper comes from the observation of how little is known 
about competitive forces that have generated the current structure in the airline industry. 
Indeed, literature on the economics of competition in air transportation 2  takes industry 
structure as given neglecting the underlying causes of it. However, this is not to ignore the 
voluminous literature on empirical models of entry and market structure in various 
industries3, including airlines, but the emphasis in our paper is to uncover robust competitive 
                                                          
2
 See for example Aguirregabiria and Chun-Yu Ho (2010), Borenstein (1989, 2005), Evans and Kessides (1993), 
Charles and Seabright (2001), Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004), Neven, Lars-Hendrik Roller and 
Zhentang Zhang  (2006), Lederman (2007, 2008).  
3
 Berry (1992), Berry and Waldfogel (1999), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Cohen 
and Mazzeo (2007), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), Shaumans and Verboven (2008), Toivanen and Waterson 
(2005). 
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mechanisms that have shaped market structure. One main robust competitive mechanism is 
the well-known endogenous sunk costs escalation process which alters consumers’ 
willingness to pay and its consequences on market structure. Another motivating reason relies 
on the fact that many models about the industrial organization of airline markets, if not most, 
consider competition with homogeneous goods 4 , settings involving horizontal product 
differentiation, or at most symmetric product differentiation5 (e.g. Berry 1992). Finally, the 
U.S. airline industry may represent an excellent natural experiment for studying competitive 
forces that have generated industrial structure because deregulation took place in the early 
1978; consequently, any imprint on current structure should be caused by the competitive 
process at work.  
The underlying hypothesis for the analysis that follows is that airlines engage in the 
competitive mechanism of endogenous sunk costs escalation. The interpreting view of this 
paper is that such investments are sunk and endogenous6. A potential source of endogenous 
sunk costs is advertising. In the literature the empirical cut-off point for advertising/sales ratio 
is 1% and was set up by Sutton (1991) for his empirical estimation of the lower bound to 
concentration for twenty industries in the food and drinks sector. This threshold  distinguishes 
advertising intensive industries from those industries where advertising does not play a role. 
Although the figure for the U.S. airline industry is not acknowledged, Nielsen Media research 
(May 2007) provides an advertising/sales ratio for the UK airline industry equal to 8.37%. 
Even if an advertising/sales ratio was below the cut-off point this industry would not be 
easily defined of an exogenous sunk costs type because another source of endogenous sunk 
costs is present. The other source of endogenous sunk costs is route structure. Firms can 
increase demand by increasing number of routes out from end points constituting a city pair. 
This route network requires endogenous fixed sunk costs (e.g. personnel training programs, 
number of established check-in points, and number of slots acquired).  
A crucial element for the validity of applying the Sutton’s bound approach is that 
endogenous sunk costs are local markets’ specific. In other words, the endogenous sunk costs 
for the airline industry should be relevant at route level. If the endogenous sunk costs pertain 
exclusively at national level we will not be able to distinguish between the endogenous sunk 
                                                          
4
 Lederman (2007, 2008) contributions represent rare examples of analysing product differentiation in the airline 
industry. 
5
 However, Lederman (2007, 2008) in her empirical analyses of frequent flyer programs (FFPs) considers a 
framework of vertical product differentiation where value of redeemed awards to travellers may be substantially 
different among carriers. 
6
 The term endogenous refers to the fact that advertising and route network are variables fully under firm’s 
control hence constituting key competitive weapons. 
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costs model from the exogenous sunk costs model using estimation of lower and upper bound 
to concentration. One claim of this paper is that there are rather substantial endogenous sunk 
costs relevant at route market level. Regarding advertising, we can observe that airlines 
establish a mix of investments in which some are more oriented at ‘brand’, often in 
newspaper advertising, while other investments are route specific, as observable from 
companies’ website. Low cost carriers tend to advertise more specific city pairs. We may 
assert that a good portion of advertising expenditure is held at route level. Regarding the 
other type of endogenous sunk costs, investments in establishing a set of destinations out 
from end points of a city pair, are relevant at route market level. Overall, we are confident in 
claiming that the endogeneity of sunk costs is relevant at city pair market level. 
Furthermore, our paper provides the first empirical test of the upper bound theory 
(Vasconcelos 2006) which predicts that in endogenous sunk costs industries maximal level of 
concentration remains invariant at any levels of market size. Finally, we find evidence that 
dominant airlines are between one and three in any city pair regardless of market size. This 
evidence suggests that the industry is a natural oligopoly. To sum up, this paper offers three 
results: i) there is evidence of a lower bound to concentration substantially above zero hence 
evidence of non-fragmentation; ii) we have monopolies even in very large route markets, so 
we have a sharp upper bound to concentration invariant to market size; iii) the number of 
dominant firms is from one to three in each city pair market irrespective of market size. 
These results suggest evidence of endogenous sunk costs competition. The implication of this 
is that price and horizontal product differentiation are not the only means of competition in 
airline markets, but quality boosted by endogenous sunk costs play an important role.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; 
Section 3 introduces some issues about data; Section 4 carries the econometric analysis; 
Section 5 provides a discussion of results and section 6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Relevant Literature 
Sutton’s Lower Bound 
The starting point of Sutton’s (1991) bound approach is to define two broad classes of 
industries: exogenous sunk costs and endogenous sunk costs industries; then the author 
develops a theoretical framework for each of the two types of industries in which to analyze 
the relationship between market size and concentration. Since the theory aims at cross-
industry empirical analysis, Sutton controls for a measure of set up costs, amount of capital 
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(fixed costs) required to enter and operate efficiently, at minimum average cost, in a given 
industry. These set-up costs may greatly differ across industries, and may be correlated with 
market size; as a result, to prevent bias in the role of market size for each industry, size is 
divided by the set-up costs. Exogenous sunk costs industries are those with homogeneous 
products or with horizontal product differentiation, therefore main competitive weapon is 
price. In contrast, endogenous sunk costs industries supply goods which are vertically 
differentiated; consequently, quality plays a crucial role. The key feature is that real 
(perceived) product quality is enhanced for means of fixed sunk costs investments, for 
example in R&D and advertising. These investments can increase consumers’ willingness to 
pay. Precisely, Sutton’s (1991) empirical analysis of twenty industries in the food and drink 
sector in six major economies is based on the distinction between advertising intensive and 
non-advertising intensive industries.  
Sutton’s main novelty is not to derive a unique prediction, but rather, to obtain a range 
of predictions which hold across a wide class of oligopoly models, abstracting from various 
factors (e.g. toughness of price competition, degree of horizontal product differentiation) 
which are difficult to proxy or measure empirically. Fundamentally, Sutton derives a lower 
bound, that is the minimal level of concentration admissible, below which nothing can 
happen in long-run equilibrium; whereas, on and above the lower bound any market structure 
is consistent with the theory. Sutton looks for only robust results applicable to a large domain 
of industries. Motivation for this approach is given by the fact that game theoretic oligopoly 
models provide conclusions which depend on model’s specifications. For instance, the 
researcher can choose among various equally reasonable assumptions regarding nature of 
competition (e.g. Cournot or Bertrand); whether firms are single-product or multiproduct; 
whether entry occurs either simultaneously or sequentially. In addition, these specifications, 
equally reasonable a priori are hard to measure empirically; as a result, often these game 
theoretic models do not produce empirically testable results.         
  Different predictions about market structure are associated with each of these two 
groups of industries. The key findings of the exogenous sunk costs model (Sutton 1991, pp. 
308) are: i) a negative relationship market size-concentration; ii) concentration converges to 
zero as market size becomes extremely large tending toward ∞ ; iii) tougher price 
competition causes a more concentrated structure at any given market size, all else equal. In 
other words, for any pair of industries/markets with comparable size but different degree of 
price competition, the theory predicts that the market with tighter price competition will show 
higher concentration. As size of the economy grows significantly, firms’ entry occurs until 
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the last firm covers fixed sunk costs without incurring in losses (free-entry equilibrium rule). 
More intense price competition causes profits per firm to fall. Consequently, the number of 
firms able to survive in the market decreases. Conversely, a situation of collusive behaviour 
may determine excessive entry of firms leading, thus, to low concentration.  
  For industries where products are vertically differentiated and thus, quality becomes 
important, Sutton develops the endogenous sunk costs model. Here, two relevant results are 
reached (Sutton 1991, pp. 308): i) the traditional negative relation market size-concentration 
is not monotonic; ii) non-fragmentation as size grows. The basic intuition is that extra 
competition emerging from a larger market size is channelled mainly into an escalation 
process of expenditure in endogenous sunk costs such as advertising; in addition, this 
property holds also in a context where both vertical and horizontal product differentiation are 
present (Shaked and Sutton, 1987). Advertising and R&D alter real and/or perceived product 
quality, so consumers’ willingness to pay increases. As product quality is improved, 
consumers will tend to shift from the outside good to the quality one; consequently, quality 
enhancements enlarge demand (market size). An implication is that expansion of market size 
does not attract further entry, but instead induces incumbent firms to increase expenditure in 
endogenous sunk costs leading to an escalation process which determines endogenously 
economies of scale. At very high levels of investments in such competitive weapons, entry 
may be even blockaded. 
 
The Vasconcelos’ Upper Bound Theory 
Vasconcelos (2006) offers tighter predictions of the relationships between market size and 
structure complementing Sutton’s (1991, 1998) work. Main research question addressed is 
that of whether arbitrarily concentrated structures can be sustained in large exogenous and 
endogenous sunk costs industries, hence if an upper bound to industry concentration exists. In 
particular, industry monopolization may be attainable for means of mergers. Building on 
Sutton’s theoretical framework, Vasconcelos adds a stage in which firms may form coalitions 
and, the equilibrium used is that of Nash stability concept. Regarding exogenous sunk costs 
industries, Vasconcelos shows that the incentive to form a monopoly coalition at the second 
stage of the game, given the number of firms entered in stage 1, depends on product 
substitutability. When products are imperfect substitutes a merger to monopoly cannot be an 
equilibrium outcome as market size increases. Suppose that  firms enter in stage 1, and at 
the second stage of the game if the firms entered agree to merge in one coalition each of them 
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will get =  . As market size increases we will get more entry, hence higher  which implies 
a lower profit for each coalition member; additionally, a firm, with imperfect substitute 
products, has the incentive to free ride on the  − 1 firms obtaining a duopoly profit which 
will be higher than    obtainable in case of joining the monopoly coalition. Therefore, the 
upper bound to concentration declines as market size increases and monopoly cannot occur. 
 For endogenous sunk costs industries Vasconcelos argues that the marginal cost of 
investing in quality is unaffected by  number of coalitions, while the marginal revenue does 
depend on the number of coalitions. The author’s analysis reveals that there are two effects at 
work on the marginal revenue of quality. One effect is the “appropriability effect” which 
Vasconcelos shows to be positive and decreasing in the number of coalitions; the revenue 
from one additional unit of investment in quality increases the fewer number of coalitions 
there are. A second effect is the “competition effect”. This is represented by the incentives to 
increase quality, hence to innovate, fostered by competition which is increasing in the 
number of coalitions. At equilibrium, the appropriability effect dominates the competition 
effects, then profit from an additional unit of investment in quality declines as the number of 
coalitions increases; as a result, the equilibrium level of quality will decline.  
The analysis at the second stage of the game, coalition formation stage, is restricted to 
parameters for the elasticity of investment, , and product substitutability, , for which only 
either a monopoly coalition or a duopoly coalition is viable at equilibrium. It is shown that 
“when products are sufficiently substitutable a duopoly coalition structure cannot be a SPE” 
(Vasconcelos 2006, pp. 242) if the two coalitions are similar in number of firms. The larger 
the number of firms composing the smaller coalition the higher the firms’ incentive to deviate 
from the duopoly coalition structure is; as a result, it will be more likely to have one coalition 
therefore, monopolizing the industry. The incentive to deviate from the duopoly coalition 
structure derives from the fact that the larger the number of firms forming the smaller 
coalition the smaller the individual firm’s share of profits. The firms will earn higher profits 
by forming a monopoly coalition. As a result, in endogenous sunk costs industries the upper 
bound to concentration exists and is unaffected by market size. In addition, monopoly can be 
an equilibrium outcome. 
 At this point, we need to discuss the applicability of this model to the airline industry. 
Airlines compete not just on prices but also along various quality dimensions such as on-time 
flights, mishandled bags (e.g. Mazzeo 2003; Forbes (2008a), (2008b)). Bilotkach (2011) 
observes as frequency is another important aspect of air transport service quality which is 
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intimately linked to output and, higher frequency lowers the total price of travel by reducing 
the schedule delay. To provide higher frequency, clearly implies supplying more seats hence 
more output, but also it increases consumer’s utility. The view of this paper is that there are 
other two attributes, advertising and routes flown out of cities of a city pair market, which, as 
discussed in the introduction, require sunk outlays. The argument brought out in the 
Introduction about the sources of endogenous sunk costs in the airline industry warrants the 
applicability of applying the ESC model hence Vasconcelos’ model to this market. 
 
Empirical evidence 
Our work extends the empirical literature about testing the endogenous sunk costs model 
within single industries. Berry and Waldfogel (2010) offer an empirical analysis on market 
structure and quality measures in the newspaper and restaurant industries, where processes of 
quality production are believed to differ. The newspaper industry is believed to be 
characterised by investments in endogenous sunk costs for quality improvements and shows 
non-fragmentation; whereas, the restaurant industry is featured by the fact that quality is 
enhanced mainly by increasing variable costs, thus leading to a fragmented structure. Dick 
(2007) studies the banking industry and Latcovich and Smith (2001) focuses on online book 
market; both finding support to the endogenous sunk costs model. Finally, Ellickson (2007) 
demonstrates that the industrial structure of the supermarket industry is explained by 
escalation of endogenous sunk costs in store size, as well as the industry is a natural 
oligopoly with a competitive fringe of lower quality stores. 
  In addition to the single industry literature in which this paper is best placed, over the 
last twenty years there has been an empirical cross-industry literature about the bound 
approach7 . Also, we have had a number of case histories documenting the evolution of 
structure within the endogenous sunk costs model in specific industries 8 . In addition, 
following the pioneer work of Sutton (1998) in deriving a bound’s approach to analyse cross-
industry differences in firms’ size distribution, we have various contributions in single 
industries applying this methodology9.  
                                                          
7
 Giorgetti (2003); Lyons and Matraves (1996); Lyons, Matraves and Moffatt (2001); Robinson and Chiang 
(1996); Symeonidis (2000); Balasubramanian and Lieberman (2011).  
8
 Bakker (2005) researches reasons of the decline of the European movie industries in the endogenous sunk 
costs escalation mechanism operated by the US industry; Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) apply the 
endogenous sunk costs model to the computer industry; Matraves (1999, 2002) explores the global 
pharmaceutical industry and how European integration has affected market structure in the soft drinks industry 
respectively; Motta and Polo (1997) studies market structure of television industry. 
9
 De Juan (2002, 2003) analyse the Spanish banking industry; Buzzacchi and Valletti (2006) apply the bound 
approach to firms’ size distribution in the Italian motor insurance industry. 
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2.3 Data 
The sample consists of 58 U.S. cities leading to a potential sample of 1653 = 	
∗
  origin-
destination markets of which, 661 have at least one firm with a positive output. Consistently 
with previous literature, we define the relevant market at route level10.  
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics compute firm’s market shares using 
“passenger miles”, number of passengers multiplied by distance. Therefore, each firm’s 
market share is given by the number of passengers travelled on its flights on a given route 
multiplied by the distance between origin and destination of that route. Also, firms with 
market shares equal to or lower than 0.01 are excluded in the computation of the 
concentration measure. Such exclusion is motivated by the fact that these values identify 
firms posing irrelevant competitive pressure to rivals and may even constitute coding errors. 
Market size is measured following Berry (1992), that is, it is defined as the product of 
population of the two end point cities for each city pair. Alternative measures have been tried, 
including the sum of populations of the two endpoints, and the population of the less 
populated city of the city pair. However, the choice of the product is felt to be better because 
of the fact that transportation demand is related to the probability of each person dwelling in 
city 2 is willing to visit city 1 depends on the number of people that such individual knows in 
city 1. Summing over such probabilities for all individuals leads to the product of 
populations11.  
The set-up costs measure used by Sutton and subsequent authors had the role to 
provide a homogenization across different industries. Since our analysis involves a single 
industry, it is reasonable to assume that the costs necessary for obtaining a single plant of 
minimum efficient scale are homogeneous across all city pair markets. In the airline industry 
the set-up costs may be associated to being operative in an airport city from which an airline 
services various destinations at minimum efficient scale. It appears reasonable to assume that 
these costs are broadly homogeneous across route markets. As a result, the stochastic frontier 
models do not include a measure for set-up costs. If set-up costs were positively correlated to 
market size we would underestimate predicted minimal concentration level. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 See chapter 1, pp. 11-12 for reasons justifying our choice of the relevant market definition. 
11Berry (1992, pp. 907 footnote 10). 
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2.4 Empirical Analysis 
In this Section we document empirical evidence about three predictions of the endogenous 
sunk costs model (ESC). The first prediction is about non-fragmentation which, we obtain 
through estimation of the lower bound to concentration. A second one pertains to the upper 
bound to concentration which is invariant to market size, and monopoly can appear in 
equilibrium in large markets. Finally, using the full population of firms we provide evidence 
that the airline industry is a natural oligopoly: one to three firms have a dominant position in 
each market regardless of size. Now, a clarification is in order. Results on the lower bound to 
concentration using the Herfindahl index actually imply the natural oligopoly result. However, 
the econometric methods used are heavily parametric, therefore the results depends 
substantially on error distributional assumptions. The evidence proposed for the third 
prediction, not suffering from that shortcoming, further reinforces the lower bound estimation.  
Estimating a bound to concentration cannot be addressed by using OLS because we 
need to estimate a bound function which envelops all observations and not an average 
relationship. 
  In this paper estimation of the lower and upper bounds are performed using stochastic 
frontier. This technique is robust to outliers and allows low concentration disequilibria. We 
estimate the following equation: 
 
 1 − ⁄  = β + β ln⁄ + ν +               (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the logistic transformation of Herfindahl 
index, and 0 <  ≤ 1. β and β are coefficients to be estimated. The odds transformation 
ratio for the dependent variable12 is employed for ensuring that predicted values of limiting 
level of concentration are between 0 and 1 as well as to prevent heteroscedasticity. The 
variable S denotes market size. The reciprocal of natural logarithm of size employed in (1) is 
based on Sutton (1991) and subsequent authors (e.g. Lyons and Matraves 1996, Ellickson 
2007). This functional form allows asymptotic HHI as market size tends to infinity to depend 
solely on the intercept term. 
In the present context, the simple framework consists of a two error structures: a two 
sided error term (%) with a normal distribution for allowing low concentration disequilibria, 
                                                          
12
 We set HHI equal to 0.99 in monopoly routes (where the HHI assumes value equal to 1 for the estimation of 
the upper bound to concentration. 
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that is, observations are allowed to be below the lower bound, and a one sided error () to 
reflect the theoretical relevance of the lower bound. There are no strong theoretical reasons 
for choosing one particular distribution for the one sided error; usually in the literature the 
truncated normal, half normal, standard exponential 13  estimators have been tried for 
estimating a lower bound, which all gave similar results in Lyons and Matraves (1996). 
%~0,  is the i.i.d. two-sided error term normally distributed; whereas, for the one-sided 
error term we assume three different distributions:ε~Half − Normal	δ ,ε~Truncated −
Normal	φ, ε~Exponentialλ . Following Greene (fifth edition), the stochastic frontier 
model given by (1) states that a relationship between the concentration measure and market 
size is defined. For any given value of market size the observed value of concentration must 
be either equal to or greater than the lower bound function given by equation (1). The one-
sided error terms   must be either zero or positive (nothing can happen below the lower 
bound in the long-run). Whereas, the two-sided error terms % can assume values of both sign 
and it serves to pick up disequilibria low concentration. Therefore since %  is a stochastic 
component which can take either positive or negative values makes the frontier stochastic. 
The error term   is a random variable which measures the distance from the bound. 
Estimation of the upper bound to concentration follows the same logic. 
 
Lower Bound to Concentration 
The data set used in this paper has the quite peculiar feature of right censored observations 
which refer to monopolies. There are 340 limiting observations that need to be excluded for 
two reasons. First, the theory underlying the lower bound to concentration does not predict 
monopoly outcomes; as a result, a pattern of data involving monopolies simply does not fit 
the theory. One theoretical explanation of monopoly outcomes, hence of the relationship 
between market size and maximal level of concentration is provided by the upper bound 
theory (Vasconcelos 2006). Second, the exclusion is necessary in order to draw the graph of 
the stochastic fitted lower bound14 requiring the majority of observations located above it. 
The distributions for the one sided error available for stochastic frontier models impose 
restrictions such that the estimated lower bound is dragged upward; for instance, the half 
normal distribution requires that much of the observation mass is close to the mode. The 
truncated normal and exponential distributions are similar to the half normal causing the 
                                                          
13
 It is worth noting that there are no theoretical reasons justifying either these three distributions or any others.  
14The three distributions used allow observations to be near the bound; therefore, since just over half of 
observations assume maximal value the distributions used tend, thus, to shift very much upward the lower 
bound. 
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same problem. This exclusion may arise concern of sample selection bias. However, 
excluding the upper bound should not bear any impact on the minimal level of concentration, 
as the stochastic frontier models just shift down the intercepts and have almost no impact on 
the slope parameter.   
  Results for the lower bound estimation are shown below in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The 
three models produce similar results as they differ solely on their assumption on disturbance 
terms. The fitted lower bound is presented in Figure 1. The coefficient of market size is 
statistically significant at 10% level and points to a weak negative relation with structure. 
Robinson and Chiang (1996, p. 392) observe that the negative impact of market size on 
concentration in an endogenous sunk costs industry is evidence of the fact that markets have 
started with a relatively small number of firms; consequently, as market size increases 
concentration falls approaching the bound limit from below. For each of the three employed 
distributions the asymptotic HHI15 as market size tends to infinity is well above zero. This 
non-fragmentation result appears to rule out the exogenous sunk costs model while pointing 
to the endogenous sunk costs competitive mechanism.  
 
Table 1 – Lower Bound 
Normal/Half normal   
HHI     Coef.  
 
  
;< -2.104**  
 
 (0.678)    
;= 32.728*  
 
 
	HHI> = 0.11 
           (0.081) 
 
 
Sample: 321       
(17.798) 
 
 
               *Significance at 10%; **Significance at 5%. 
     Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15HHI∞ = @
βA
B@βA 
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Table 2 – Lower Bound 
Normal/Truncated normal 
      HHI Coef. 
 
 
;< -1.810** 
 
(0.646) 
;= 30.219* 
 
 
HHI> = 0.14 
               (0.102) 
 
 
 
Sample: 321 
(16.897) 
               *Significance at 10%; **Significance at 5%. 
     Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 3 – Lower Bound 
Normal/Exponential  
HHI Coef.  
 
  
;< -1.748**  
 
(0.636)  
;= 29.676*  
 
 
HHI> = 0.15 
           (0.080) 
 
 
 
Sample: 321 
(16.723)  
               *Significance at 10%; **Significance at 5%. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1 – Lower Bound 
 
 
We also perform lower bound regressions using alternative measures of market 
structure16which produce a similar lower bound for C2, while for C1 and C4we obtain 
evidence of a null relationship between size and structure; that is, coefficient of market size is 
never significant. 
These findings showing that sign and significance of the slope are not stable for all 
the market structure measures employed are suggestive that the data pattern appears 
consistent with endogenous sunk costs competitive mechanism. 
 
Upper Bound to Concentration 
Vasconcelos’ model (2006) provides two empirically testable predictions for endogenous 
sunk costs industries:  
1) There is a high maximum level of concentration (upper bound) even in large markets 
which does not depend on size; 
2) Monopoly can occur in equilibrium regardless of market size. 
Empirical evidence lends support on predictions 1) and 2). Figure 2 shows that the maximal 
level of concentration, given by the estimated upper bound, does not decline as size increases, 
and monopoly can emerge in equilibrium. The upper bound to concentration is given by an 
asymptotic Herfindahl level, ∞ = 0.99 using the model normal/half normal. In fact, in 
our data set we have 51% of our sample markets which are monopoly17 lying indeed on our 
estimated upper bound. However, the result can depend on the choice of which value to set 
                                                          
16
 Concentration ratios C1, C2 and C4. 
17
 As monopolies are considered markets with a dominant airline with at least 99% of market shares.  
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for monopolies (whether the value 0.9 or 0.99, 0.999, 0.9999, etc.). We re-estimate the upper 
bound setting the value HHI = 0.9 for monopoly markets, and we obtain a negative slope for 
the normal/half normal model while independence between market size and market structure 
for normal/truncated normal and normal/exponential models. This empirical evidence, 
therefore, supports Vasconcelos (2006) predictions about endogenous sunk costs industries. 
 
Figure 2 – Upper Bound 
 
 
A model of Bertrand competition with homogeneous products and fixed costs of entry 
would produce monopoly equilibrium outcomes. As a result, the upper bound to 
concentration could be explained alternatively by such model of Bertrand competition for 
homogenous products, where vertical product differentiation plays no role. The Nash 
equilibrium in the entry stage would be to enter if and only if no other rival has entered. 
Indeed, if more than one firm enters, then the usual Bertrand argument will lead to losses 
equal to the fixed cost of entry. The anticipation of this will suffice to get market structure 
equilibrium with only one firm charging the monopoly price. However, the result found 
earlier of a positive and substantially high lower bound to concentration as market size 
increases suggests vertical product differentiation. As a result, the maximal level of 
concentration coinciding with monopoly equilibria regardless of market size appears to be 
consistent with the empirical prediction of the upper bound theory.   
 
Natural Oligopoly 
Now our objective is to provide evidence that structure of this industry is best explained by 
the natural oligopoly theory developed by Shaked and Sutton (1983).The Shaked and 
-
2
0
2
4
6
20 25 30 35
ln (Pop1*Pop2)
ln(HHI/1-HHI) upper_bound
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Sutton’s early paper develops a necessary and sufficient condition for the finiteness property. 
The finiteness property states that there exists, for an interval of qualities EF, FG, a Nash 
equilibrium constituted by an upper bound to the number of single product firms with 
positive market shares charging price above marginal cost. Price competition drives down 
prices such that even the poorest consumer will not buy low quality products. The condition 
necessary and sufficient for existence of the finiteness property relies on the fact that there 
need to be no consumer indifferent between alternative products; consequently, all consumers 
agree in ranking the qualities in exactly the same order.  
The finiteness property is more likely to be present in those vertically product 
differentiated industries where quality is enhanced through fixed costs; whereas, variable 
costs remain constant or increase very modestly or even decrease as quality rises.  
Table 4 provides information on number of structures, in terms of firm numbers, the 
dataset contains. We note that the majority, 93%, of markets have at most four firms. 
 
Table 4 – Number of airlines across routes 
Relevant N #Markets Percent     Cum. 
    
1 340 51.44 51.44 
2 159 24.05 75.49 
3 82 12.41 87.9 
4 37   5.6 93.49 
5 20 3.03 96.52 
6 15 2.27 98.79 
7 3 0.45 99.24 
8 3 0.45   99.7 
9 2   0.3 100 
    
Total 661 100  
 
Table 5 provides some further descriptive facts on structure. We can note various 
facts i) that a large majority (84% with a share of at least 90% for the two biggest) of airline 
markets are dominated by at most two firms; ii) for markets with at least two firms the first 
largest firm is on average almost three times bigger than the second largest; iii) the 
Herfindahl-Hirshman index is on average extremely high; and iv) market share asymmetry 
for markets with at least two firms, measured by coefficient of variation (CV), is not high on 
average.  
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Table 5 – Market Shares and Concentration 
Market 
shares 
(s1=first 
largest, s2= 
second 
largest) 
  # Markets Mean Std. Dev.      Min Max 
 
     
s1        321 0.673 0.213    0.207  1 
s2        321 0.238 0.153    0 0.499 
s1+s2        661 0.956 0.097    0.385  1 
s1+s2≥ 0.9        557 0.993 0.017    0.901  1 
s1+s2≥ 0.7 
HHI 
CV 
N 
       635 
       661 
       321 
       661 
0.971 
0.792 
0.672 
1.974 
0.065 
0.249 
0.370 
1.387 
   0.701 
   0.147 
   0.001 
   1 
 1 
 1 
 1.928 
 9 
 
Given the market structure of our sample, firm numbers and market share asymmetry 
can be shown by a simple geometric device, the oligopoly triangle (Davies, Olczak and Coles 
(2011)). It provides a clear representation of structural features of markets in terms of 
concentration and asymmetries. Figure 3 depicts the oligopoly triangle with S2 (second 
largest airline) on the horizontal axis and S1 (largest airline) on the vertical axis. The 
concentration in the triangle is given by the sum of top two firms in each market (S1+S2). 
Moving toward North-West we find high concentration and extremely pronounced 
asymmetries up to the North-west vertex of the triangle which identifies monopoly; whilst, 
moving from the North-West vertex toward South-East along the edge we have markets less 
asymmetric up to the South-East vertex which represents symmetric duopoly. Also, starting 
from monopoly and moving down toward South we find markets with lower concentration 
and greater symmetry up to the south vertex representing a perfectly symmetric triopoly. The 
vast majority of airline markets of our sample are fitted into the small triangle delimited by 
the above described vertices. In addition, most of those markets inside the small triangle 
show very high concentration and strong market share asymmetry. Relatively few markets lie 
outside our small triangle, showing smaller concentration and smaller size asymmetry 
moving down toward south nearer to the forty-five degree line. These city pair markets 
appear to have a fairly sizeable fringe. In addition, all markets with three or fewer airlines 
must be inside the small triangle, but the reverse is not necessarily true. In other words, some 
markets with more than three firms may lie inside the small triangle18.  
                                                          
18
 Davies, Olczak and Coles (2011) develop and characterize fully the oligopoly triangle and its properties. 
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Figure 3 – Oligopoly Triangle 
 
Figure 4 – Duopoly Triangle 
 
Figure 5 – Triopoly Triangle 
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Figure 6 – Oligopoly Triangle for more than 3 firms 
 
 
Figures 4-619 depict the triangle for different market structures. First, we note that 
among the 159 duopolies we find, at one extreme, those with one dominant firm accounting 
for the majority of shares; while at the other extreme, we observe those duopolies that are, 
more or less, symmetric; in between, our sample includes genuine, but still, rather 
asymmetric duopolies. The triopoly triangle, along as a limited number of symmetric 
triopolies, shows many markets with considerable market share asymmetries. Also, there are 
triopolies dominated by one very big firm. Finally, figure 6 proposes the triangle for the 80 
oligopolies with more than three firms. All markets inside the triangle are dominated by at 
most two firms; thus, having small third and following firms. In contrast, below the triangle 
we envisage around 30 markets with more than two leading airlines; these are mainly 
triopolies and few quadropolies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 In Figures 3-6 the diamond in the legend actually correspond to a point (S1, S2). 
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We can derive the following stylized facts: 
 
FACT 1: from Table 4 we learn that just above half of our observations consist of monopoly 
routes.  
 
FACT 2: from the oligopoly triangles we infer considerable market share asymmetries. 
 
FACT 3: Table 4 also suggests that duopolies account for nearly one-quarter, and triopolies 
represent a further 12% of the sample (eighty-two markets).  
 
FACT 4: Table 4 finally says that markets with more than four firms represent a rather 
negligible portion of our sample, approximately 6%. 
 
FACT 5: of the 159 duopolies, 88 have the largest firm20 with over three-quarter of market 
shares, that is, 	J1 > 0.75; then 33 are characterized by 0.6 < J1 < 0.75; whilst, for the 
remaining 38 duopolies we have J1 ≤ 0.6, constituting fairly symmetric duopolies.  
 
FACT 6: 80% of the triopolies (66 markets) have a quite tiny third firm with a market shares 
up to 20%; for the remaining triopolies, 16 city pairs, the third airline has market shares 
sandwiched between 32% and 20%.  
 
FACT 7: from Tables 6 below, we infer that among the 80 markets with four or more firms 
solely two (those highlighted in bold) have the first two largest firms possessing a combined 
share lower than 50%. 
These facts lead to one analytical result: inspecting Table 6 below, given Figures 3-6 
above, using Facts 5-7, and given Figures 1-2 we deduce that the number of dominant airlines, 
those taking up the majority of market shares, is between 1 and 3 irrespective of market size. 
This indeed suggests that the industry is a natural oligopoly.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 We denote with J the market shares of firm i-th.  
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Table 6 – C2 across oligopoly routes 
Oligopolies C2 range  
 
  
Quadropolies  0.67-0.98  
   
5 Firm markets 0.53-0.94  
   
6 Firm markets 0.52-0.87  
   
7 Firm markets 0.46-0.67  
   
8 Firm markets 0.53-0.82  
   
9 Firm markets 0.39-0.78 
 
 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Results of this paper paint a picture about the underlying competitive process at work in the 
airline industry. These results also help to identify those competition models that are and 
those which are not appropriate as candidate explanations of market structure and firms’ 
conduct about the airline industry. 
Models of competition with homogenous products and exogenous fixed sunk costs 
(Sutton 1991) are excluded in explaining the industrial organization of the airline industry, 
since fragmentation must occur. A fragmentation result is predicted also for horizontally 
differentiated industries with single-product firms and simultaneous entry (Shaked and Sutton 
1990), contrasting therefore our finding. Models with either competition on a line, Hotelling 
(1929), D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), or on a circle, Salop (1979) are not 
appropriate for two reasons: i) the airline industry is multi-product and more importantly ii) 
because a larger market size leaves room for a greater number of firms to enter in the market, 
and therefore concentration would be low, which here clearly it is not.  
The finding of a lower bound to concentration not converging to zero when market 
size grows is inconsistent even with competition models of vertical differentiated products 
where quality investments are sustained by an escalation of variable costs, which gives rise to 
an increase of marginal costs. That context is identified, for example, by the restaurant 
industry. Indeed, Berry and Waldfogel (2010) finds that this industry fragments as market 
size grows and restaurant firms provide distinct products in terms of quality. Clearly, serving 
better food (so higher quality) implies investments in variable costs. 
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The empirical findings of non-fragmentation and existence of an upper bound to 
concentration invariant to market size are suggestive of evidence that structure and behaviour 
of our industry is best explained by a model of endogenous sunk costs (Sutton 1991; 
Vasconcelos 2006), and by the early vertical product differentiation literature (Gabszewicz 
and Thisse 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton 1982, 1983). This strand of vertical differentiation 
literature is characterized by the idea that quality is improved through fixed sunk outlays, and 
variable costs either remain constant or increase modestly (‘the increase of unit variable cost 
is strictly less than the marginal valuation of the richest consumer’, Shaked and Sutton 1987, 
p. 136). High concentration is also proved in a theoretical framework combining vertical and 
horizontal product differentiation (Shaked and Sutton 1987), which is consistent with our 
results of concentrated equilibria.  
In addition to the endogenous sunk costs model, the finding of maximal level of 
concentration constant at any size is supported by a class of models encompassing horizontal 
product differentiation: i) theoretical models of multiproduct firms entering sequentially, 
therefore filling all profitable niches by product proliferation (Schmalensee 1978); ii) of 
monopolist’s location choice (Bonanno 1987); iii) explanations of local monopolies (Prescott 
and Visscher 1977, Eaton and Lipsey 1979 and Reynolds 1987). 
One of endogenous sunk costs sources in our industry, route structure, may be 
interpreted as investments in extra capacity with the goal to deter entry. In fact, airlines 
increasing the number of routes serviced from endpoints of a city pair are potentially 
prepared to supply bigger output (more routes may imply more flights hence more passenger 
miles travelled). Therefore, our results of high concentration are also consistent with the class 
of models involving capacity investment decisions to deter entry (Spence 1977, 1979; Dixit 
1979, 1980; Bulow, Geanakopolos and Klemperer 1985). 
Along as the results of non-fragmentation and monopoly at any size, we find evidence 
of a further prediction of the endogenous sunk costs model: natural oligopoly. Indeed, we 
find that dominant firms range between one and three in each market, regardless of market 
size. This result further suggests evidence consistent with vertical product differentiation 
where quality is improved with escalation of sunk costs: advertising and route structure. The 
findings of non-fragmentation and natural oligopoly are obtained also by Ellickson (2007) for 
the U.S. supermarket industry.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we present empirical evidence of the size-structure relationship using the 
Sutton’s framework (1983, 1991) and the complementary theory by Vasconcelos (2006). 
Three main results of the ESC model are reached: i) non-fragmentation - evidence of a lower 
bound to concentration with asymptotic concentration level well away from zero; ii) evidence 
of an upper bound to concentration regardless of size, hence arbitrarily high concentration 
including monopoly can be sustained as equilibrium even in large city pair markets; iii)using 
the full set of firms we find that irrespective of market size the number of dominant firms 
ranges between one and three, suggesting that the structure of the airline industry mirrors a 
natural oligopoly. Overall, the results of this paper suggests that models of airline 
competition entailing homogeneous products and assumptions of horizontal product 
differentiation are not the best or at least the most complete representation of this industry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FIRM NUMBERS, MARKET SHARE ASYMMETRY AND 
COMPETITION BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF FIRMS  
 
Abstract: This paper deduces the nature of competition from empirically analysing firm 
numbers and market share asymmetry, as well as the competitive effects between different 
types of firms. Using a novel data set for a large cross-section sample of city pair markets, 
we extend the literature on market structure in various ways. First, we complement the 
bounds approach by investigating structure above the lower bound, and then unlike previous 
literature on empirical models of market structure and entry we study determinants of size 
inequalities, which can reveal about the competitive process as much as it is concealed when 
looking just at number of firms and firm’s entry decision. The literature on empirical market 
structure is also extended by analysing nature of competition between different types of firms. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The study of industrial market structure has always been one of major topics of interest 
among industrial organization economists since Bain (1956). In fact, it is well known that by 
studying market structure we can draw inferences about the underlying competitive process 
about a specific industry. This is not just of academic interest, but it also bears substantial 
relevance for antitrust policy. 
 The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we study the determinants of firm 
numbers and market share asymmetry in the U.S. airline industry for a cross section sample 
of 661 city pair markets. The reason for analysing separately number of firms and market 
shares asymmetries relies on the issue that, studying market share asymmetries of individual 
firms may uncover information on the underlying competitive process which may remain 
concealed when looking just at firm numbers. Our second objective is to analyse competitive 
effects of two types of airlines in terms of their route structure, leaders and non-leaders. 
 In the previous Chapter we applied the bounds approach to market structure, 
providing evidence on various predictions of the ESC model. In this paper we continue the 
theme of studying concentration, again with the aim to deduce information on the competitive 
mechanisms at work; but, this time, we use an approach in the spirit of Bresnahan and Reiss’s 
(1991) work. The methodology of this Chapter complements the analysis performed in 
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Chapter 2 by analysing concentration above the lower bound and below the upper bound. A 
main difference between this Chapter and the previous one, is that here we use econometric 
techniques which provide a fit to the scatter of data points, hence an average relationship 
between the variables of interest rather than estimating frontiers. Under an economic point of 
view, the analysis performed below enriches the bounds approach for means of describing 
how different market characteristics affect firm numbers and market share asymmetry and, 
more importantly, investigating competitive effects between different types of firms. 
Furthermore, while in the bounds approach symmetric firms equilibria are involved, in this 
chapter we attempt to explain firms’ market share asymmetries. 
We attempt to explain the number of firms in each city pair by ordered probit models, 
using a vector of covariates representing market characteristics. We find strong evidence of a 
positive relationship between market size and firm numbers, as well as of more fragmentation 
in large hub city pairs; in contrast, route markets with a longer distance between end points 
show substantial evidence of fewer firms. 
 We then proceed to analyse market shares asymmetries of individual firms across our 
sample of markets. We find evidence that market size is irrelevant; whilst, in large hub routes 
airlines have greater firm size inequality. In city pairs with longer distance there is strong 
evidence of less pronounced firms’ market share asymmetry. In addition, routes with 
identities of leaders show evidence of more pronounced asymmetry in market shares. 
Finally, we perform an empirical analysis of competitive interactions between two 
groups of airlines we identify in the dataset, leaders and non-leaders. Surprisingly, we find 
strong evidence that both number and identities of leading airlines affect positively the 
number of non-leaders in each route market. The empirical evidence appears to point to 
learning; non-leaders infer profitability of routes by the presence of leaders.   
 The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related 
literature. Section 3 introduces some features of data. Section 4 provides formal empirical 
analysis of firm numbers and market share asymmetry. Section 5 studies empirically the 
nature of competition between leader airlines and non-leaders. Section 6 discusses main 
results. Finally Section 7 concludes. 
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3.2 Related Literature 
This paper investigates the nature of competitive process inferred by analysing market 
structure in the U.S. airline industry. In the previous chapter we applied the endogenous sunk 
costs model (ESC).A well acknowledged limitation of the bounds approach is that all what 
the econometric evidence is about is solely an estimation of the lower bound and of the upper 
bound to all possible market structures admissible. Indeed, the theory is consistent with 
multiple equilibria. Our paper complements the literature by investigating market structure 
between the two bounds to concentration. 
A parallel strand of literature to which this paper is related, refers to empirical models 
of market structure based on specific oligopoly theories tailored to the industry study in hand. 
Recent applications involve the video rental industry (Seim 2006), health care professions in 
Belgium (Shaumans and Verboven 2008), supermarkets (Cleeren, Verboven, Dekimpe, and 
Gielens 2010) and the UK burger industry (Toivanen and Waterson 2005)21. However just as 
the literature on the bounds approach, this empirical literature about entry and market 
structure explains the number of firms or firm’s individual entry decisions, neglecting to 
account for firm size inequalities. Our paper attempts to fill this gap in uncovering 
information on the competitive process concealed when investigating firm numbers solely. 
Under this latter aspect, our paper is modestly related to the time-series literature on size 
distribution22 which, part of it, is centred on the Gibrat’s Law23 (Gibrat 1931) by which firm 
growth rate follows a random walk; that is, firm growth rate is independent of its initial size 
and their size distribution conforms to skewed Yule distribution.   
 
                                                          
21
 Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), using ordered probit models, construct the novel concept of entry thresholds 
which relates the equilibrium number of firms to market size (measured by population); the estimated entry 
thresholds tell how much population is needed to support a given number of firms. Bresnahan and Reiss 
estimate also the entry threshold ratios which are ratios of per-firm market sizes; if this ratio is above one it 
means that entry increases competition. They find that the level of competition changes quickly as the number 
of firms increases, as well as most of competitive effect of entry is exhausted with the second or third entrant. 
Moreover, the literature has focused more explicitly on entry by solving the difficult problem of firm 
heterogeneity (Berry 1992 who used a simulated method of moments estimator proposed by McFadden (1989) 
and Pakes and Pollard (1989)). Other contributions extend the Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) framework in 
allowing different types of firms (e.g. Mazzeo (2002) endogenizes product choice decisions for motels of high 
and low quality in Western U.S.). In addition, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) estimate the social inefficiency 
caused by free entry in radio broadcasting. 
22
 See the large literature of stochastic models of firm’s growth; examples are Hart and Prais (1956), Simon and 
Bonini (1958), Ijiri and Simon (1964, 1977), Jovanovic (1982), Davies and Lyons (1982), Davies and Geroski 
(1997), Sutton (1998).  
23
 For surveys and discussions of the Gibrat’s Law, see, for example, Curry and George (1983), Hall (1987), 
Davies (1988), Geroski and Machin (1992). 
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3.3 Data24 
The variables used in the empirical analysis are: 
 Coefficient of variation of market shares, CV. This represents the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean. In addition, for each city pair the Herfindahl and CV are linked 
by the following formula25: 
MN = √ ∙  − 1 
 
N stands for the number of firms operating in a given route. 
 Market size. As in the previous chapter, market size is defined as the product of 
population of the two end point cities for each city pair. It is expressed in thousands of 
billions. 
 Distance. This picks up costs and gives number of kilometres between end points of 
each city pair. It is expressed in thousands of kms.  
 Tourist dummy. A dummy equal to 1 for all markets with at least one end point city 
located either in California or Florida, plus other two locations, Aspen and Colorado 
Springs.  
 Two hubs. This is a dummy for routes having large hubs at both endpoints. 
 One hub. A dummy for city pair markets containing one endpoint as large hub is 
introduced in the empirical models.  
 One dummy for each of the seven leader airlines. These are American, Delta Airlines, 
Southwest, Continental, US Airways, United Airlines and Northwest. These leading 
airlines are identified as those who service the greater number of routes. 
 Number of leaders. This identifies how many of the seven leaders operate in each city 
pair market. 
 Number of non-leaders: Number of non-leading airlines in each route. 
 
3.4 Firm Numbers and Market Share Asymmetry: Empirical Results 
In this Section, we provide an econometric analysis of concentration in attempting to explain 
the variation of firm numbers and market shares asymmetries across our sample of city pair 
                                                          
24
 For more details upon the data set and the measurement of variables, we refer the reader to chapter 0. 
25Following De (2010), we can derive the formula for CV directly from the Herfindahl-Hirshman index, 
 =  +  ∗ 

. Now  ∗   can be written as  Q
R
 R⁄ ⇒
QR
	 TUR∗
; replacing R  by V

 we obtain  Q
R
WR∗ , so, 
 =  +
QR
WR∗ ⇒  =

 + MN
 ∗  ⇒  =
XYRB
 ⇒ MN = √ ∗  − 1 . 
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markets located above the lower bound and below the upper bound estimated in the previous 
chapter.  
 
Firm Numbers 
To explain the first component of concentration, number of firms, we set out a very simple 
two-stage game, where in the first stage firms “enter” or “stay out” while in the second the 
entered firms play some competition game that determines post-entry profits. The number of 
firms present in a market is assumed to be an indicator of underlying market profitability. We 
specify a reduced form latent profit function for the total number of firms in market Z: 
 
[\ = ]\ + \ (1) 
 
Where ] is a vector of market characteristics,  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and 
~Φ0,1 is the stochastic component of profits i.i.d. as standard normal. A main assumption 
we make is that all firms within a route market do not have unobserved heterogeneity; in 
other words, the stochastic component of profits in each market is common to all firms. In 
addition, in our analysis we do not include firms’ characteristics, therefore, implying also no 
observed firm heterogeneity26.  
This simple theoretic structure leads to the use of ordered probit models where the 
“observable” dependent variable is the number of airlines observed in each city pair market.  
Results about the number of firms regressed against a vector of market characteristics 
are shown in Table 1. There is evidence that market size’s coefficient is significant at one per 
cent level and positive, therefore bigger markets, on average, have more firms; distance 
brings evidence of being strongly significant and negative in sign; tourist is not significant, 
while large hub routes show strong evidence of a greater number of firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 In the next section we analyse competitive effects of different types of firms. 
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Table 1 – Determinants of firm numbers 
N Coef. 
 
 
Market Size 0.038*** 
 
(0.013) 
Distance -0.451*** 
 
(0.052) 
Tourist -0.017 
 
(0.100) 
Two-hubs 1.131*** 
 
(0.145) 
One-hub 0.434*** 
 
 
Observations: 661 
Pseudo ^ = 0.086 
Log likelihood = -
823.83183 
(0.109) 
***Significance at 1%. 
 
Fewer firms in city pairs of greater length may be explained by the fact that, to 
operate in a longer route requires higher costs (e.g. fuel).  
Regarding the three dummies, Tourist, Two hub and One hub, more than one effect 
can be at work. First, there can be a size effect; tourist and large hub markets may have size 
which could not be represented by just the product of populations of end point cities, 
therefore these dummies control for possible bias of our market size measure. In addition, in 
these markets the nature of competition may differ. In particular, tourist markets may be 
characterized by tougher price competition since demand can be much more elastic, making 
price undercutting more profitable. These two effects determine coefficient’s sign in opposite 
directions. A positive coefficient would signal evidence that the size effect prevails on that of 
more intense price competition; whereas, a negative sign would suggest evidence that the 
competitive effect dominates the size effect. In large hub markets the nature of competition 
may lead a priori to either fiercer or softer competition. Previous literature tend to suggest 
that competition may well be limited in hub city pairs (Borenstein and Rose 2008 provides a 
good review); however, there may be the case that dominant firms running the hub need to 
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compete fiercely in order to maintain and consolidate their leadership (e.g. Etro 2006). 
Consequently, the expected coefficient’ sign for large hub markets is indeterminate.  
Our reduced form econometric model for explaining firm numbers cannot disentangle 
whether the positive coefficients for large hubs are caused solely by size effects, or also a 
different nature of the competitive process is at work; in contrast, the model for market share 
asymmetry, presented below, does.  
 
Market Share Asymmetry 
The considerable asymmetry within oligopolies found in Chapter 2 deserves formal analysis. 
Our dependent variable is the coefficient of variation of market shares, taking into account 
the full set of firms in our dataset.  
Clearly, monopoly city pairs produce a coefficient of variation equal to zero. Given 
the large fraction of monopolies in our sample (just over 50%), the distribution of our 
dependent variable appears to be censored; as a result, it calls for the need to apply Tobit 
estimation. However, the Tobit method is not valid under assumptions of non-normality; 
producing, in fact, not consistent estimates when distribution of data for the dependent 
variable is not normal. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality (Shapiro and Wilk 1965) suggests 
rejecting the null hypothesis of normal distribution; consequently, we cannot apply Tobit 
technique.  
An econometric estimator which is consistent and asymptotic normal is the censored 
least absolute deviations estimator (CLAD) (Powell 1984). Essentially, the method 
generalizes the quantile regression (least absolute deviations, LAD) for censored data. In 
addition, CLAD proves robust to heteroscedasticity; indeed, the standard errors are estimated 
by bootstrap techniques.  
Results are reported in Table 2. Route markets with longer distance appear to be more 
symmetric with significance at 1% level; whereas, the large hub dummies have evidence of 
positive coefficients, thus of larger market share asymmetries. Market size and the tourist 
dummy bring evidence of bearing no effect.  
The distance variable proxies costs, essentially due to fuel, which are the same for all 
airlines within a market, it attenuates firm size inequality; as a consequence, routes with 
longer distance indicates an equal increase of costs for all the firms, then bringing down 
market share asymmetry. 
 City pairs with greater traffic flow, large hub routes identified by the two dummies 
two-hub and one-hub, show evidence of more pronounced market share asymmetry. Intuition 
  
42 
 
and theoretical literature suggest that higher firm size inequality may signal tougher product-
market competition. For leading firms running the hub our estimates suggest findings 
consistent with theories of aggressive leadership (Etro 2006). In addition, suppose a vertical 
differentiated products oligopoly in the sense of Shaked and Sutton (1982). If firms compete 
a’ la Bertrand, the higher quality firm will get most of the market; whereas, in case of 
Cournot competition, the higher quality firm will obtain bigger market shares but not as much 
as in the Bertrand case. Supposing collusive conduct, we do not know exactly but generally 
the firms might split the market fifty/fifty. Moreover, the theoretical literature on collusion 
(e.g. Tirole 1988) and, empirical evidence on cartels seem to point out that coordinated 
strategies are harder to sustain when firms are less symmetric in terms of market shares (e.g. 
Davies, Olczak and Coles 2011). 
 The set of dummies for identities of leaders have all statistically significant 
coefficients except that of Southwest, and positive in sign. Therefore, we have evidence of 
greater market share asymmetry when one leader is present. The strongest effect on size 
inequalities appear to be that of US Airways, which has the biggest coefficient. Following the 
argument, as set above, of interpreting bigger size inequalities as signal of more intense 
product market competition, we can infer that each leader, surprisingly except the low-cost 
airline Southwest, contributes to intensify product market competition.  
Our proposed interpretation of results may be challenged by the following counter 
argument. A positive coefficient for the leading airlines may reveal a first mover, reputation 
or brand loyalty leader role. However, leader firms need to gain some sort of competitive 
advantages in order to be first movers, or to build a reputation for instance for means of 
supplying better quality (e.g. on-time flights, wide route structure) or charging lower fares, or 
developing brand loyalty. These arguments are then assimilated to tougher product market 
competition; leading firms in order to consolidate and improve their leadership role as first 
movers, or for brand loyalty or reputational reasons, need to compete fiercely and this is 
consistent with the strategy of top dog (Etro 2006). 
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Table 2 – Determinants of market share asymmetry 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
                Coef. 
 
Constant         
 
-0.176 
 
Market Size 
(0.149) 
0.013 
 
(0.019) 
Distance      -0.198*** 
 
(0.054) 
Tourist -0.024 
 
(0.094) 
Two-hubs     0.428*** 
 
(0.140) 
One-hub    0.329*** 
 
American                    
 
Delta Airlines 
 
Southwest 
 
Continental 
 
US Airways 
 
United Airlines 
 
Northwest 
 
 
Initial sample: 661 
Final sample: 340 
Pseudo ^` = 0.1663 
(0.131) 
   0.234*** 
(0.088) 
   0.377*** 
(0.106) 
0.117 
(0.093) 
   0.442*** 
(0.104) 
   0.552*** 
(0.107) 
    0.321*** 
(0.122) 
    0.412*** 
(0.121) 
 
***Significance at 1%; robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
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3.5 Competitive Effects between Leaders and non-Leader airlines 
This Section asks the question: what is the competitive effect, hence nature of competition, 
between leaders and non-leader airlines? We assume that firms enter sequentially, where the 
most profitable move first. We argue that the leaders, having a wide route structure, are more 
profitable27 hence enter first. We employ ordered probit models using as dependent variables 
the number of non-leading airlines observed in city pair markets; among the covariates we 
include the number of the leaders. We also control for a vector of market characteristics, the 
same used in the previous section. 
Table 3 below shows results about the impact of number of leading airlines on non-
leaders. The analysis is restricted to those city pair markets with at least one leader because of 
our interest in assessing non-leaders market structure when at least one leader is already in 
the market. Market size and large one-hub bring evidence of being not significant. Distance 
appears to have a highly significant negative relationship with number of non-leaders. There 
is evidence that in tourist and in large two-hub markets the number of non-leaders is greater. 
Our variable of greatest interest here is the number of leaders. We note strong evidence that 
as the number of leaders increases so the number of non-leaders does.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27Borenstein and Rose (2008) reviews a literature which argues in part that running a hub and spoke network 
bears demand and costs advantages.  See also Levine (1987). 
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Table 3 – (Ordered Probit) Effect of number of leaders 
N of non-Leaders                     Coef. 
 
 
 
 Market Size 0.002 
 
(0.015) 
Distance    -0.238*** 
 
(0.066) 
Tourist 0.258** 
 
(0.124) 
Two-hubs 0.320* 
 
(0.177) 
One-hub -0.059 
 
(0.137) 
N of Leaders       0.246*** 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Pseudo ^` =0.0695 
Log likelihood = -
427.64902 
(0.053) 
*Significance at 10%**Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
 
The positive relationship we have found bears the question whether using identities of 
leaders confirms the results; in addition, we can explore whether specific leaders affect 
differently the number of non-leaders. In other words, the leaders may offer different quality 
among themselves, therefore there may be differences of vertical product differentiation 
among the group of leading airlines (e.g. some may engage in greater investments in 
advertising and for expanding route structure). Clearly, the analysis continues to be restricted 
to those city pairs with at least one leader.  
Table 4 reports the impact of the identities of the leaders; it shows that only the 
airlines American, Delta and US Airways have evidence of statistically significant 
coefficients. The evidence of a positive coefficient suggests that the number of non-leaders is 
bigger in routes where these three leaders operate.  
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Table 4 – (Ordered Probit) Impact of identities of leaders 
Number of non-leaders                 Coef. 
 
 
Market Size 0.003 
 
(0.015) 
Distance     -0.332*** 
 
(0.065) 
Tourist 0.107 
 
(0.127) 
Two-hubs 0.287 
 
(0.182) 
One-hub -0.046 
 
(0.137) 
American     0.448*** 
 
(0.130) 
Delta Airlines   0.354** 
 
(0.145) 
Southwest 0.162 
 
(0.144) 
Continental 0.009 
 
(0.161) 
US Airways     0.526*** 
 
(0.161) 
United Airlines 0.252 
 
(0.176) 
Northwest -0.084 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Pseudo ^`= 0.0738 
Log likelihood = -
425.66592 
(0.190) 
**Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
 
 To explore leader heterogeneity, we compare results shown in Table 4 with a series 
of regressions reporting each leader in turn. Each dummy takes the value of one when the 
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leader, say American, is present and of zero when one or more of the other six leaders are 
present. The logic is to ascertain if and at what extent the leading airlines differ among 
themselves in affecting the number of non-leaders. We report results of only those two 
regressions regarding American and US Airways that have statistically significant 
coefficients. Tables 5-6 provide results which broadly confirm those of Table 4. To conclude, 
the two leaders, American and US Airways, appear to have an additional effect on the 
number of non-leaders compared to the other leading airlines.  
 
Table 5 – (Ordered Probit) Impact of American 
Number of non-leaders               Coef. 
 
 
Market Size 0.010 
 
(0.015) 
Distance              -0.339*** 
 
              (0.064) 
Tourist                0.179 
 
              (0.122) 
Two-hub                0.496** 
 
               (0.171) 
One-hub                0.022 
 
               (0.135) 
American 0.340*** 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Pseudo ^` = 0.0543 
Log likelihood = -
434.63653 
               (0.124) 
**Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
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Table 6 – (Ordered Probit) Impact of US Airways 
Number of non-leaders                   Coef. 
 
 
Market Size 0.017 
 
(0.015) 
Distance      -0.313*** 
 
(0.063) 
Tourist 0.194 
 
(0.123) 
Two-hub    0.442** 
 
(0.174) 
One-hub -0.002 
 
(0.136) 
US Airways     0.421*** 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Pseudo ^` = 0.0541 
Log likelihood = -
434.72525 
(0.155) 
**Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
 
The results documented in Tables 3-6 are, somewhat, not explainable by traditional 
theories of oligopoly competition. In fact, what we would expect is a negative effect of the 
number of leaders and their identities upon the number of non-leaders. This is because a firm 
choosing to enter in either a monopolistic market or into a duopolistic one will choose the 
former. In contrast, theories of learning (e.g. Baum, Li and Usher 2000; Caplin and Leahy 
1998) provide a theoretical rationale for firms learning size and profitability of markets for 
means of observing rivals’ decisions of entry and operation. In particular, Caplin and Leahy 
propose a formal model to capturing an information externality. This externality refers to the 
fact that firms assess demand and profitability of a market through waiting and observing for 
success (or failure) of rivals entering that market. Therefore, presence of the leaders in airline 
city pair markets may signal good profitability, thus, encouraging entry by small non-leader 
airlines.  
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Clearly, our analysis being in cross section does not really pick up dynamics, hence 
learning effects. However, the evidence seems consistent with the possibility of a learning 
process which would reflect the snapshot we observe. In addition, one may interpret the 
results as follow: some of the leaders create an environment in which fringe airlines thrive, 
while others do not. This interpretation would misunderstand the results. The main message 
is provided by estimates reported in Table 3, whereas number of leaders increases so the 
number of non-leaders (hence non-leaders’ profits) does; whereas, in Tables 4-6 it is explored 
leader heterogeneity, that is, if some leaders are different in affecting non-leaders’ profits 
(hence their number) and we obtain evidence that some leaders have an additional effect of 
non-leaders entry compared to other leaders, which is not to say that some leaders provide an 
environment in which non-leaders can prosper, while others do not. 
 
Robustness checks. We re-estimate our ordered probit models inserting the market 
characteristic variables also in non-linear way (square and natural log) under the reasoning 
that possible nonlinearities may bias the coefficients of the market structure variables. In 
addition, we exclude the market characteristic with insignificant coefficients. Finally, we try 
different econometric techniques, OLS and Poisson model. The results of our market 
structure variables are nearly the same as those in the baseline specifications28. 
 
Alternative Hypotheses 
The results of Section 5 seem consistent with evidence of learning. Airlines infer size and 
profitability of routes from presence of other carriers’ type; in particular, American and US 
Airways appear to perpetrate an additional positive effect on the number of non-leaders. 
Now, we discuss potential alternative explanations to these findings, succeeding to rule out 
all of them. 
 
A) Mature Industry 
Our reading and interpretation of the results of this section may be subjected to criticism. Size 
and profitability of airline city pair markets should be well known as full deregulation took 
place in late seventies; therefore, the learning argument in our context may be flawed. 
However, the airline industry is subjected to extremely high demand volatility and 
                                                          
28
 The results of our robustness checks are reported in an appendix at the end of this chapter. 
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uncertainty (e.g. Borenstein and Rose 2008); consequently, this high degree of uncertainty 
may warrant learning behaviour even in this mature industry. 
 
B) Crowd Externality 
The same phenomenon may be explained by a theory of crowd externality, Rauch (1993). 
The author formalizes the idea that later entrants benefit from a crowd made by two or more 
incumbents; the intuition is that there may be positive spillovers among firms caused by 
economies of agglomeration. However, it is unlikely, in the airline industry, to get a story 
consistent with the crowd externality involving economies of agglomeration among airlines 
operating on a route. Actually, we may well obtain a negative crowd externality because of 
delays and congestion costs which can reduce demand. 
 
C) Competition head-to-head 
Consider that in Chapter 2 we provide evidence that airlines engage in endogenous sunk costs 
escalation in advertising and in expanding route structure. A direct implication of the 
endogenous sunk costs model is that firms compete head-to-head. This is because, any firm 
vis-à-vis rivals can carve out a fraction of consumers by increasing fixed sunk outlays. 
Consequently, our results of positive effects of the number of leaders on non-leaders may be 
explained by competition head-to-head. However, this interpretation is not valid for the non-
leaders. Each airline of this group has a fairly tiny route structure; as a result, they do not 
seem to escalate investments in expanding network of routes from end points of the city pairs. 
Furthermore, advertising expenditure may be lower than that of leaders. The non-leaders, 
then, are not incentivized in competition head-to-head as implied by the ESC model. In 
contrast, given the evidence of data patterns it appears more plausible the interpretation that 
non-leaders infer market profitability by observing leaders’ behaviour, as rationalized by the 
theories of learning. 
 
D) Strategic Complementarities 
Non-leader and leader airlines offer air transport service between end points of city pairs; 
such competitive environment is characterized by strategic substitutability. However, this 
type of service can involve strategic complementarity when some non-leaders are regional 
airlines operating routes on behalf or in partnership with some national leaders. This is, 
indeed, the case in our dataset; there are 16 non-leaders that are regional airlines with 
business links with some of the leaders. 
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 In order to account for this strategic complement activity, in the econometric analysis 
of this section we have excluded the regional carriers with links with the leaders, re-
computing the variable number of non-leaders. Consequently, all the results reported in 
Tables 3-6 are robust to the strategic complementarity effect. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
The result of greater size inequalities in large hub city pair markets merits further discussion 
and clarification. We have already noted earlier that the greater number of firms in large hub 
routes can be explained by larger market size, or by different competitive conduct, or by a 
combination of both. Clearly, market share asymmetries may be the result of several factors 
such as, capacity differences, cost heterogeneity, differences in quality (vertical product 
differentiation). Our econometric model for size inequalities cannot tell us how many and 
which of these factors have determined the asymmetry, since data on capacity, costs, or 
quality measures is hardly available. However, the results on firm size inequality seem to 
lend support to the hypothesis that product-market competition is tougher in large hub 
markets (more pronounced asymmetries when the focus on some dimensions of competition 
is tough). As a consequence, the evidence on asymmetry suggests that the nature of 
competition changes in large hub routes. 
 We have found in the previous section the empirical evidence that, markets with a 
bigger number of leaders show a positive relation with number of non-leaders. These patterns 
in the data suggest that markets with one firm type receive more entry from rival firm type. 
The proposed interpretation, as discussed in the previous section, is that of learning. Toivanen 
and Waterson (2005) provide empirical evidence of learning for the UK counter service 
burger industry.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper we present empirical evidence on the determinants and competitive forces 
generating equilibrium market structure in the U.S. airline industry. The core of the analysis 
has been to model empirically firm number and market share asymmetry as well as 
investigating competitive effects between two firm types to deduce the nature of competition 
beyond the bounds approach applied in the previous chapter.  
Main results refer to greater size inequalities for large hub routes as well as for 
identities of leaders, apart from Southwest, which appears consistent to tougher product 
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market competition for these city pairs. We then empirically analyse competitive interactions 
between two types of airlines, leaders and non-leaders. The main finding is evidence 
consistent with learning; non-leaders tend to infer profitability of markets from leaders. In 
particular, the leaders American, perhaps Delta Airlines, and US Airways seem to have an 
additional effect in signalling market profitability to non-leader airlines.   
The results of this paper paint a detailed portrait of the underlying competitive process 
at work. To understand, at least under some aspects, competition is of great importance for 
antitrust authorities, as well as for firms that need to comprehend the competitive 
environment in order to better interact strategically with rivals. In addition, we feel that our 
work contributes to the debate (Borenstein and Rose 2008) of how in the airline industry 
competition works, after more than three decades of deregulation. 
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Appendix 
 
In Tables 7-8 below we run ordered probit models entering market characteristics in non-
linear way. 
 
Table 7 
N of non-Leaders              Coef. 
 
 
Market Size 0.030 
 
(0.043) 
Distance  0.955* 
 
(0.518) 
Market Size^2 -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Distance^2 -0.207** 
 
(0.089) 
Ln Market Size 0.012 
 
(0.046) 
Ln Distance -0.542** 
 
(0.257) 
Tourist 0.235* 
 
(0.126) 
Two-hubs 0.254 
 
(0.187) 
One-hub -0.102 
 
(0.141) 
N of Leaders 0.260*** 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Log Likelihood=-423.81996 
Pseudo ^ = 0.0779 
 
(0.054) 
*Significance at 10%**Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
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Table 8 
N of non-Leaders              Coef. 
 
 
Market Size 0.039 
 
(0.044) 
Distance  0.558 
 
(0.529) 
Market Size^2 -0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Distance^2 -0.149 
 
(0.090) 
Ln Market Size 0.027 
 
(0.046) 
Ln Distance -0.441* 
 
(0.263) 
Tourist 0.095 
 
(0.128) 
Two-hubs 0.169 
 
(0.197) 
One-hub -0.105 
 
(0.142) 
American 0.405*** 
 
(0.132) 
Delta 0.389*** 
 
(0.147) 
Southwest 0.133 
 
(0.146) 
Continental 0.038 
 
(0.163) 
US Airways 0.594*** 
 
(0.164) 
United Air 0.269 
 
(0.179) 
Northwest -0.064 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Log Likelihood= -
422.36773 
Pseudo ^ = 0.0810 
 
(0.191) 
*Significance at 10%; ***Significance at 1%. 
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In Tables 9-10 we estimate ordered probit models dropping market characteristics with not 
significant coefficients. 
 
Table 9 
N of non-Leaders Coef. 
 
 
Distance 0.989* 
 
(0.513) 
Distance^2 -0.212** 
 
(0.088) 
Ln Distance -0.551** 
 
(0.256) 
Tourist 0.225* 
 
(0.125) 
Two-hubs     0.382*** 
 
(0.138) 
N of Leaders    0.255*** 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Log Likelihood=-
424.7712 
Pseudo ^ = 0.076 
 
(0.052) 
*Significance at 10%; **Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
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Table 10 
N of non-Leaders  Coef. 
 
 
Distance  0.604 
 
(0.516) 
Distance^2 -0.147* 
 
(0.089) 
Ln Distance -0.447* 
 
(0.260) 
American 0.478*** 
 
(0.126) 
Delta 0.432*** 
 
(0.140) 
Southwest 0.185 
 
(0.142) 
Continental 0.056 
 
(0.159) 
US Airways 0.640*** 
 
(0.155) 
United Air 0.318* 
 
(0.172) 
Northwest -0.020 
 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Log Likelihood= -
427.12532 
Pseudo ^ = 0.0707 
 
(0.185) 
*Significance at 10%; ***Significance at 1%. 
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In the following Tables we report results using OLS and Poisson models for the baseline 
specification. 
 
Table 11 – OLS 
N of non-Leaders             Coef. 
 
 
Constant       0.234*** 
 
(0.089) 
Market Size -0.002 
 
(0.009) 
Distance     -0.108*** 
 
(0.032) 
Tourist    0.146** 
 
(0.065) 
Two-hubs 0.175* 
 
(0.095) 
One-hub -0.054 
 
(0.070) 
Number of Leaders      0.156*** 
 
 
 
           Observations: 553 
^ = 0.66277 
 
(0.029) 
*Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
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Table 12 – Poisson model 
N of non-Leaders             Coef. 
 
 
Constant     -1.179*** 
 
(0.215) 
Market Size -0.007 
 
(0.014) 
Distance     -0.314*** 
 
(0.085) 
Tourist 0.376** 
 
(0.152) 
Two-hubs 0.395* 
 
(0.204) 
One-hub -0.115 
 
(0.175) 
Number of Leaders 0.260*** 
 
 
 
Observations: 553 
Pseudo ^ = 0.0719 
 
(0.055) 
*Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
59 
 
CHAPTER 4 
ENTRY AND TERRITORY ALLOCATIONIN THE U.S. 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY29 
 
Abstract: We assess collusion in terms of territory allocation among airlines. To this goal, 
first we develop a sequential entry model estimating firm-specific entry functions, for a cross-
section sample of 661 airline city pair markets. Entry decisions depend upon market 
characteristics and market structure (rival’s presence). Secondly, we construct another entry 
model using, in place of market structure dummies, variables measuring firm’s own and 
rivals’ number of routes flown out of end points constituting a city pair. Results suggest 
evidence consistent with the possibility of market collusion. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
To study intensity of competition is a core theme among industrial organization economists. 
In addition to the usual challenges posed by understanding impact of factors such as demand 
and cost conditions, concentration, barriers to entry, on competition, we face considerable 
additional challenges when firm multi-market contact plays a role. The possibility that firms 
relax competition in each other territory in presence of important multi-market contact (MMC) 
has been recognised since a long ago, proved formally by Bernheim and Whinston’s (1990) 
study.  
 The exogenous feature of firms competing in many local geographic markets, may 
lead to avoiding competition head-to-head; firms may reserve to themselves some territories 
(Scherer and Ross 1990). We can trace several antitrust cases involving this type of ‘market’ 
collusion in the US, under the Sherman Act for example, and with reference to the 1996 
Telecommunications Act which recommends firms to enter into each other’s territory. Also 
in Europe, the European Union competition office has faced cases on market collusion as the 
one involving Solvay and ICI in 1990, where the two firms proved to be guilty on market 
allocation30. In addition, the empirical literature on cartels brings forward the facts that, in 
some cases, cartelists make agreements on territory allocations (De 2010). 
                                                          
29
 This chapter has benefited greatly by the help of Franco Mariuzzo for means of several discussions, by 
generating the algorithm for implementing the sequential order of entry in our model 1, and by generating the 
variables contained in the vector W in model 2.  
30Belleflamme and Bloch (2004) mention these antitrust cases.  
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 Firm’s behaviour towards allocating geographic markets to themselves need not raise 
necessarily a case of collusion, but, it may just qualify as unilateral behaviour. Firms can 
have incentive to avoid competition head-to-head by entering in submarkets where some 
rival(s) is not present. Traditional microeconomic theory suggests that competition reduces 
profits; therefore, whenever a firm has to decide to enter either a monopoly market or one in 
which it faces competition, all else equal, it will choose to enter in the former. This incentive 
to avoid rival’s competition may also arise when firms have home markets. In these cases, it 
could be an optimal strategy to naturally stick on own home markets. Although unilateral 
effects do not break antitrust law, they may be harmful as much as coordinated strategies. 
The empirical analysis of this paper has its rationale on the theoretical framework 
developed by Belleflamme and Bloch (2004). While Bernheim and Whinston (1990) take 
MMC as given and develop collusive pricing implications, Belleflamme and Block 
endogenize MMC. The authors study bilateral market sharing agreements in oligopoly and 
auction markets; that is, firms can establish bilateral agreements on not to compete in each 
other market. For example, suppose two firms, X and Y, and two markets, A and B. In 
addition, suppose that each firm has a home market; therefore, for instance, firm X has its 
home in market A and firm Y has its home in market B. Now, suppose that the two firms 
agree to stick on their home markets. As a result, firm X will stay in A without entering 
market B, while firm Y will remain in market B without entering market A. The model by 
Belleflamme and Bloch (2004) contemplates N firms each with a home market. Firm’s 
incentives at the base of deciding to establish bilateral market sharing agreements depend on 
characteristics of the two markets involved. More precisely, any firm engaging in a reciprocal 
market sharing agreement faces two conflicting incentives: 1) to increase profits by having 
one less competitor in its home market; 2) to give up to profits obtainable in foreign market. 
Belleflamme and Bloch impose the following properties on firm profit functions: i) 
each firm profit decreases as number of firms increases; ii) each firm profit decline decreases 
as the number of firms increases. Consequently, firm profits are convex in the number of 
firms; iii) rate of decline of firm profit, that is percentage of profit reduction as a new firm 
enters the market, is decreasing in the number of firms. This property defines the profits as 
log-convex in the number of firms. The authors show that property i) is satisfied for Cournot 
oligopoly models with homogeneous products, increasing and convex costs, and inelastic 
slope of inverse demand function. Properties of convexity, ii) and iii), are satisfied for 
Cournot oligopoly models with homogeneous products, linear costs, inelastic slope of the 
inverse demand function, and increasing elasticity of the slope of inverse demand function. 
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For private value procurement auctions profits are shown to be both decreasing and log-
convex in the number of firms. The property of log-convexity guarantees existence of stable 
collusive networks. A collusive network is the set of reciprocal market sharing agreements. 
Belleflamme and Bloch apply definitions of network theory to describe structure of stable 
collusive networks where firms and markets are identical. The concept of stability relies on i) 
once an agreement takes place both firms prefer to maintain it in place; ii) if two firms are 
unlinked (they do not establish an agreement) both cannot have an incentive to form an 
agreement. The authors show the following necessary and sufficient conditions to have stable 
collusive networks: 
 The network can be decomposed into a set of isolated firms and components. The 
components have to be complete (all firms establish bilateral agreements among 
themselves) and of different firm numbers (different size), if components are of same 
size the log-convexity of profits in the number of firms will induce the two 
components to merge; 
 A lower bound on the number of bilateral agreements for each components has to 
exist; 
 If the number of market sharing agreements is equal to one then there must be at 
most one isolated firm. 
A key vision in our paper follows the work by Belleflamme and Bloch (2004): 
multimarket contact is seen as endogenous; that is, it is the fruit of endogenous entry 
decisions through which, airlines decide in which city pair markets to compete along with 
rivals. We build two reduced-form econometric models of entry to find if there is evidence 
consistent with market sharing agreements. First, we implement a static sequential entry 
game where rivals’ presence affects entry decisions along as market and firm characteristics. 
Estimates suggest that, mostly, market structure (past entry decisions) lowers firms’ profits 
hence likelihood of entry. In addition, we build a second static entry model where, instead of 
using market structure variables (firm dummies), we include number of routes flown out of 
end points for each airline of each city pair as a proxy for rivals’ presence. Results mostly 
confirm the pattern of the first model. Overall, there is evidence consistent with the 
possibility of market collusion31. 
The airline industry appears to be a natural setting for testing this theoretical model 
for two reasons. First, a feature of the assembled database is that airlines seem to compete in 
                                                          
31We refer to section four for details on our findings. 
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same city pairs relatively rarely. Secondly, the multi-product nature of the airline industry 
may provide a suitable environment to encourage strategic behaviour in terms of market 
contact and territory allocation.  
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 syntheses related 
literature. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 provides the reduced form approach to entry. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Related Literature 
This paper is related to two strands of the literature. As we attempt to study if and at what 
extent firms choose to prevent competition head-to-head in local markets, our work is related 
to the literature concerned with the empirical measurement of the relationship between MMC 
and collusion. We analyze firm’s choice of challenging rival competition in same local 
markets by estimating two discrete choice game theory models of entry; consequently, this 
paper extends the empirical static entry literature.  
 
Relationship between MMC and Collusion 
The first formal theory linking MMC to competition is developed by Bernheim and Whinston 
(1990). The theory predicts that MMC is irrelevant to collusive pricing when products are 
homogeneous, firms and markets are identical, and firms have constant returns to scale; 
whereas, when markets differ in terms of firm numbers and discount factor an increase of 
MMC can ease collusion. Similarly, when firms are heterogeneous in terms of costs, MMC 
can facilitate collusion. However, Bernheim and Whinston also show that sometimes MMC 
makes collusion harder; for example i) with identical firms and heterogeneous markets prices 
can fall in some markets because of MMC, while raising in other markets, ii) when markets 
are identical and firms have different costs, MMC can cause either higher or lower prices 
depending upon the discount factor. 
Based on this theoretical framework, an empirical literature has flourished testing the 
main prediction which states a positive link between multimarket contact and prices. We can 
mention Piloff (1999) finding a positive empirical link between MMC and profitability in the 
banking industry; Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) provides empirical evidence in support of a 
positive relation between MMC and collusion for the cement industry; Busse (2000) in the 
cellular telephone industry finds not only that MMC allows harsher punishment, but also 
finds evidence that it helps coordination through price signalling; Fernandez and Marin (1998) 
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find empirical evidence of a positive relation between MMC and price competition for the 
Spanish Hotel industry. Feinberg (1985) analyses the impact on price-cost margins in place of 
price for several industries. Parker and Roller (1997) study multimarket contact and collusion 
in the mobile telephone industry. This theme has been explored also in the airline industry 
(e.g. Ciliberto and Williams 2012; Evans and Kessides 1994; Singal 1996) confirming the 
prediction that contacts can cause higher prices. A smaller empirical literature has looked at 
the effects of MMC on non-price competition in the airline industry; Prince and Simon (2008) 
look at service quality in terms of flight-delays, and Bilotkach (2011) studies the impact on 
frequency. Both these papers provide evidence of higher delays and lower frequency, 
respectively, as MMC is enhanced. 
The theory developed by Belleflamme and Block (2004) about territory allocation, has 
not received attention by academic empirical research. This theoretical approach suggests that 
in empirical studies multimarket contact should be seen as endogenous; in other words, firms, 
if colluding, select local markets in which to enter taking care of not entering into those 
markets where rivals are present, with which agreements have been taken place.  
 
Empirical models of Entry and Market Structure 
A strand of the literature to which this paper is related, refers to empirical models of entry 
and market structure. A seminal article in this area is that of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), 
where a structural econometric model for homogenous goods and identical firms is 
constructed. Demand is assumed to be characterized by a representative consumer, and 
technology is featured by U-shaped average cost curves. The authors estimate a structural 
profit function of the following sort: 
 
    Π\ = \∙ ∗ N∙\ − c∙\                                         (1) 
 
The left hand side represents the profits for the total number of firms in a given market Z. 
The right hand side includes a market size function of population, multiplied by a variable 
profit per customer function, minus fixed costs. Bresnahan and Reiss assume that the 
unobserved component of profits is common to all the firms; this assumption allows them to 
estimate ordered probit models. Moreover, the authors set the coefficient of population in the 
function ∙ equal to one as N∙ contains a constant term, as well as allowing interpretation 
of the other variables included in the function as shifts in population equivalents. In the 
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function N∙ demand and cost shifters are included along as positive intercepts capturing 
profits falling in the number of firms, while in the fixed costs function c∙ the price of land 
is included to identify fixed costs effects. 
The authors develop the novel concept of entry thresholds which relates the 
equilibrium number of firms to market size (measured by population); the estimated entry 
thresholds tell how much population is needed to support a given number of firms in a market. 
Mathematically the entry threshold is given by the ratio of unobservable fixed costs to 
equilibrium variable profits per customer, and it gives the level of market size needed to 
support a single entrant. Bresnahan and Reiss estimate also the entry threshold ratios which 
are ratios of per-firm market sizes; if this ratio is above one it means that entry increases 
competition. As a result, these entry threshold ratios measure how the level of competition 
changes with the number of firms. They find that the level of competition changes quickly as 
the number of firms increases, as well as most of competitive effect of entry is exhausted 
with the second or third entrant. 
Berry (1992) solves the difficult problem of firm heterogeneity for airline city pair 
markets using a simulated method of moments estimator proposed by McFadden (1989) and 
Pakes and Pollard (1989). Berry uses airport presence as observed firm heterogeneity in terms 
of fixed costs; airlines servicing a larger number of routes flown out of end points 
constituting a city pair or being present in at least one end point are assumed to have lower 
fixed costs. The specific research question addressed is to quantify firms profit advantages in 
operating a city pair from airport presence at the end points of the route. Additional articles 
studying entry in airline markets include Goolsbee, A., and Syverson, C., (2008), Bilotkach, 
Hueschelrath and Mueller (forthcoming), Boguslaski, Ito and Lee (2004), Dunn (2008), 
Oliveira (2008), and Reiss and Spiller (1989). 
 Mazzeo (2002) and Cohen and Mazzeo(2007) extend the Bresnahan and Reiss’ 
methodology to motels in the Western U.S. and to the U.S. banking industry respectively. 
Mazzeo develops econometric models which make both endogenous product types and entry 
decisions to infer competitiveness from firm numbers for a cross-section sample of local 
markets. Mazzeo specifies a separate profit function for each firm type as follows: 
 
            Πd\ = ]\d + efgd;ijk + d\        (2)  
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The right hand side of equation (2) encompasses three terms. The first term represents a 
vector of market characteristics reflecting demand and profitability of a given marketZ.The 
second term captures effects of competitors of each typel (ij is a vector of number of firms 
of each type); for instance, if in a local market we have a market structure configuration of 
two types 2; 2, a firm of a given type will face one competitor of own type and two 
competitors of other type. Mazzeo assumes that competitors are strategic substitutes hence 
profits decline in the number of firms, but profits decline less if competitors are of a different 
type. The third term is the unobserved portion of profits which varies depending on firm type, 
and follows either a bivariate standard normal distribution in the two-type case or a trivariate 
standard normal distribution in the three-type case. The dependent variable is then either an 
ordered pair for two product-type or an ordered triple for three different firm types. 
 Given multiplicity of equilibria that may arise easily in such context, the author 
responds by mapping equilibrium to the number of firms and assuming sequential entry. Also, 
moving from two to three types it requires using a ML simulator estimator. Results suggest 
that product differentiation gives higher profits because competition between different 
product types is less intense. 
 Competitive effects of different types are also analysed by Shaumans and Verboven 
(2008) for the health care professions in Belgium. They estimate bivariate (two types of firms, 
pharmacists and physicians) ordered probit models with and without entry restrictions (in the 
form of a ceiling for the number of firms of a given type that can enter) for a cross-section 
sample of local markets, and a model with both entry restrictions and strategic 
complementarity, by inclusion of dummies about other type’s presence in addition to market 
structure dummies for own type competitors. The authors assume strategic complementarities 
between pharmacists and physicians hence profits of one type are increased by presence of 
other type. Results provide evidence that entry restrictions lead to fewer predicted number of 
firms of both types and higher profits, with consequence detrimental of consumers’ welfare. 
 Traditional IO theories of entry predict that if a firm has to choose between entering a 
market in which faces competition and one monopoly market, under the assumptions that the 
two markets are identical, the firm will choose to enter the monopoly market. Whenever entry 
deterrence occurs, it will make such prediction even more likely. In particular, with 
sequential entry the first mover can prevent entry by product proliferation (e.g. Schmalensee 
1978, Bonanno 1987, Hay 1976). In addition, in endogenous sunk costs industries where 
vertical product differentiation is prominent, the competitive mechanism of endogenous sunk 
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costs escalation may block entry (Sutton 1991) and, through mergers, firms can succeed to 
monopolize an industry (Vasconcelos 2006) 32 .Toivanen and Waterson (2005) ask the 
question whether when learning size and profitability of a market from watching behaviour 
hence success (failure) of incumbents may reverse the traditional prediction. The authors 
answer this question by constructing an empirical model of market structure based on a panel 
sample of entry data into local markets in the U.K. burger counter service industry. As we 
estimate a model of entry where firm entry decision depends on rival presence and we 
estimate firm-specific entry equations, the Toivanen and Waterson’s (2005) article is the 
closest to our work. 
Toivanen and Waterson argue that the industry is characterized mainly by two major 
players, McDonalds (McD) and Burger King (BK); as a consequence, the authors, unlike 
previous work, estimate firm-specific entry functions. They first develop a reduced form 
econometric model at the heart of which there is the following profit function to be estimated 
(Toivanen and Waterson (2005) pp. 688): 
 
   Πmn = ]mn + efopmn , ^qrsmn, gk + %mn                 (3) 
 
The latent variable is the profit for firm qq	t	uvwx, yz{ in market | in period }. This latent 
variable has the observable counterpart in whether firm q  is in the market or not. More 
specifically, the entry decision for each firm in each period is phrased as follows, opening or 
not a new outlet in a given market. The right hand side of equation (3), like previous 
literature, contains a) a vector of market and firm specific factors related to market 
profitability; b) a function e∙ containing market structure dummies which represent past 
entry decisions; c) an i.i.d. error term with standard normal distribution, %mn~Φ0,1 . 
Toivanen and Waterson estimate equation (3) by Random-Effects Probit method. 
Interestingly, they find that market structure dummies have positive coefficients hence 
positive marginal effects. Own and rival outlet presence increases probability of opening a 
new outlet for both firms. The authors interpret and explain these results in the light of 
theories of learning (e.g. Baum, Li and Usher 2000; Caplin and Leahy 1998). Then they 
engage in an extensive range of robustness checks to possible correlations between market 
characteristics’ covariates and unobservables, and to misspecification issues. The results are 
robust to all the checks they make. The second step in the analysis is to develop and 
                                                          
32See chapter 2 of this dissertation for details on models of endogenous market structure. 
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implement a structural econometric model of a static two-stage sequential entry game, where 
McDonalds is the leader and Burger King is the follower.  
 Other contributions include Seim (2006), who develops a very general empirical 
framework with incomplete information (she assumes that firms do not have full information 
on rival firms profitability) to analyze joint entry decisions and firm location choice applied 
to the video rental industry; Berry and Waldfogel (1999) study inefficient (excessive) entry in 
radio broadcasting; Scott Morton (1999; 2000) analyses entry in generic pharmaceutical 
markets as well as if pre-expiring brand advertising deters entry in the generic pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
4.3 Data 
Relevant data for this paper is based upon a large cross-section sample of 661U.S. airline city 
pair markets for the year 2006.The variables used in the econometric model of entry and 
market structure are: 
 Market size. As in previous chapters, market size is defined as the product of 
population of the two end point cities for each city pair and is expressed in thousands 
of billions.  
 Distance. This measures the length in kilometres of the route and is expressed in 
thousands.  
 Tourist dummy. A dummy equal to 1 for all markets with at least one end point city 
located either in California or Florida, plus other two locations, Aspen and Colorado 
Springs.  
 Two hubs. This is a dummy for routes having large hubs at both endpoints. 
 One hub. A dummy for city pair markets containing one endpoint as large hub is 
introduced in the empirical models.  
 Z. This variable represents the number of routes flown out of origin/destination points 
constituting a city pair by each airline. 
 One dummy for each of the seven leader airlines. These are American, Delta Airlines, 
Southwest, Continental, US Airways, United Airlines and Northwest. These leading 
airlines are identified as those who service the greater number of routes. 
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 One dummy for the non-leader airlines33. This is equal to one if one or more non-
leaders are in the route 
 Nrt_1-nrt_8. These eight variables measures the number of routs flown out of the end 
points for American, Delta Airlines, Southwest, Continental, US Airways, United 
Airlines, Northwest and non-leaders respectively. 
Recall that according to the FAA, large hub airports are defined as those carrying at least one 
percent of the total annual passenger boardings. In Table 1 we present number of routes 
serviced by each airline; while in Table 2 we provide some information of the route market 
overlaps between the major carriers. 
 
Table 1 – Number of Routes serviced by leaders 
           # Routes 
 
Leaders                                                
 
American                   136             
Delta Airlines            113             
Southwest                  107                    
Continental                  77             
US Airways                 69 
United Airlines            68            
Northwest                    65 
 
 
Total                           635          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 As explained in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, the distinction between leaders and non-leader 
airlines is based on the number of routes each firm services across our dataset.  
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Table 2 – Measure of MMC  
Firm-pairs Observed Contacts 
American - Delta 20 
American - Southwest 18 
American - Continental 15 
American - US 12 
American – United Airlines 18 
American - Northwest 8 
Delta - Southwest 5 
Delta - Continental 30 
Delta – US Airways 8 
Delta - United 11 
Delta - Northwest 4 
Southwest - Continental 6 
Southwest – US Airways 14 
Southwest – United Airlines 10 
Southwest - Northwest 2 
Continental – US Airways 10 
Continental – United Air.  6 
Continental - Northwest  1 
US Airways - United  8 
US Airways - Northwest  2 
United Airlines - Northwest  2 
 
4.4 Two models of entry 
Model 1. Our model borrows its structure from existing empirical literature on discrete 
choice game theory models of entry (e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss 1991; Berry 1992; Reiss 1996; 
Mazzeo 2002; Cohen and Mazzeo 2007; Toivanen and Waterson 2005).  
We establish a very simple static two-stage model where in the first stage the entry 
decision for each firm takes place involving whether operating or not in a given market and, 
entry is assumed to happen sequentially. Also, when firms make their entry choice do not 
take into account the impact of this on later entrants’ decisions; while in the second stage 
competition either in prices or quantities occurs. In this second stage the nature of 
competition is assumed to be common knowledge among all firms. The firms entry decisions 
are assumed to be indicators of market profitability and the coefficients can be interpreted as 
the derivatives of profits with respect to the variables at the right hand side. As discussed by 
Toivanen and Waterson (2000), if we estimate a simultaneous entry model consisting of a 
system of discrete choice equations where each equation has ’s entry as an explanatory 
variable in the equation for q’s entry will lead to (1) multiple equilibria. For instance, in case 
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of monopoly equilibrium and with two potential entrants we get two Nash equilibria for 
which we do not know which firm enters and which does not; (2) endogeneity, as q’s entry 
depends on ’s entry and vice versa. To solve the problems (1) and (2) either we use the total 
number of firms as dependent variable or we estimate a sequential entry game. The latter 
solution is the choice we make in this paper. We impose an order of entry in terms of the 
routes flown out of end points constituting a city pair market. In the literature the order of 
entry is commonly assumed to be in base of profitability; also, the literature suggests that our 
firm characteristic (variable Z defined in the previous section) increases profits; for instance, 
it can be interpreted as a fixed costs term as Berry (1992) does, assuming that later entrants 
have higher fixed costs, then naturally, we impose an order of entry in base of our firm 
characteristics which implies assuming an order of entry in the light of profitability as it is 
standard in the literature. Common to the literature, a firmq enters in market Z if and only if 
expected gross profits, once fixed costs are taken into account, are non-negative: 
 
    π\ − c\ ≥ 0        (4) 
 
In our context, each firm decides to enter in a city pair market if: 
 
                [\ = ]\ + \ + e^qrsJ\, g ≥ 0     (5) 
 
We estimate firm-specific probit equations using standard ML, applying the following 
reduced-form profit function as outcome of the competition stage: 
 
                               [\ = ]\ + \ + e^qrsJ\, g + \	       (6) 
 
Subscript q  denotes a firm ( q	t	uZqws, x}s, F}ℎpJ}, M}q}s,
	qpsJ, q}	q, }ℎpJ}, {, Z a city pair market. 
The vector ]\ encompasses market specific variables related to market profitability 
and its attractiveness,  is a vector of market-specific parameters to be estimated. In the 
vector ]\ we include, Market size (product of populations of both end points of a city pair), 
Tourist (dummy equal to 1 for route markets where at least one of the two end point cities are 
either in California or in Florida and for Aspen and Colorado Spring), Distance (measured in 
km between end point cities), Two-hub (dummy equal to 1 for city pairs where both end 
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points qualify as large hubs), One-hub (dummy equal to 1 for route markets with one end 
point as large hub). 
The variable \  is the number of routes serviced by airline q in market Z. Berry 
(1992, pp. 890-891) reviews some of the early literature about effect of airport presence on 
route’s profitability; some theories highlight that, to service routes flown out from the end 
points of a city pair can provide demand and costs advantages, whereas other contributions 
sustain the thesis that airport presence may provide strategic advantages in preventing entry. 
In particular, such firm characteristics introduced in our model could capture fixed costs and 
demand advantages; a wider route structure out of the city points of the pair may help gaining 
lower fixed costs and a larger fraction of consumers. Now it is worth noting the following 
point; one may object that this variable may be endogenous and, if so, correlated with the 
error terms. However, this may not be the case as in our context the relevant market is 
defined at route level. As a result, the number of routes flown out of the end points of a city 
pair can be an exogenous factor.  
The function e∙is a function of rival presence in each city pair market (see Mazzeo 
2002; Cohen and Mazzeo 2007; Toivanen and Waterson 2005); it contains dummies for rival 
firms.g is a vector of firm-specific parameters to be estimated. Fundamentally, these market 
structure variables can represent past entry decisions. 
 The error term \, which incorporates factors not observed by the econometrician, is 
assumed to be i.i.d. and is distributed as standard normal,	Φ~0, 1.  
 To sum up, the profit equation (6) contains demand and cost factors captured by the 
vector ], observed firm heterogeneity, captured by the variable Z, firm interactions, included 
in the function e∙, and the stochastic profit component, , modelled as standard normal. 
 
Model 2. As alternative method and for robustness purposes, we estimate the same static 
entry game except for the fact that, in place of using firm dummies as explanatory variables 
we include the number of routes flown out of the end points constituting a route for each 
leader airline and for the variable non-leaders. We postulate that rivals’ number of routes 
flown out of end points is a good proxy for rivals’ profits. Since there are no firm dummies 
among the covariates there is no concern of simultaneity of entry decisions and multiplicity 
of equilibria, and therefore, there is no reason for implementing a sequential entry game. The 
equation being estimated is: 
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    [\ = ]\ +\ + V\                                        (7) 
 
Where the latent dependent variable is the profit of firm q ; ]  is the vector of market 
characteristics, exactly as in model 1;  is a vector of firm characteristics which, include the 
number of routes flown out of the end points by the firm q(the variable Z in model 1) and 
number of routes flown out of end points by q’s rivals (the eight variables nrt_1-nrt_8);  is a 
vector of market specific parameters to be estimated;   is a vector of firm specific 
parameters to be estimated; and V\ is a i.i.d standard normal error term, Φ~0,1.  
For both models, we adopt a probit approach rather than using the total number of 
firms (e.g. ordered probit) because we are very much interested in the individual firms’ entry 
decisions and on how firm identities affect entry.  
 
Results. From variables contained in the vector ]\we expect the following. For Market size 
we clearly expect a positive coefficient, while for the variable Distance we expect a 
coefficient with negative sign, because this variable incorporates variable costs (e.g. fuel). 
We interpret the three dummies, Tourist, Two-hub and One-hub, exactly in the light of the 
reasoning proposed on pages 43-44 of this dissertation. 
In Tables 3-4 we report probit results and marginal effects about individual entry 
decisions for the sequential entry game, Model 1. There is evidence that coefficient of Market 
size is always positive and significant at 5% level for American and Delta and at 10% for 
Continental, while statistically insignificant for the other airlines. The coefficient of Distance 
is statistically significant and negative for American, Southwest, Continental and non-leaders 
whilst is positive and significant for Delta; we cannot tell reasons for such non-consistency. 
Coefficient of Tourist has evidence of being significant and positive for American, Delta, 
Southwest and US Airways; therefore for these airlines in tourist markets the size effect 
offset the competition effect. There is evidence of a negative and significant coefficient for 
the airline Northwest, thus, for this firm in tourist routes the size effect is dominated by the 
competition effect. Regarding the variable two-hub, there is evidence of positive and 
significant coefficient for US Airways and Northwest and, negative and significant 
coefficient for Southwest. The variable one-hub appears negative and significant about 
American, Delta, Southwest, Continental and non-leaders.  
 The variable   which, as noted earlier, captures firm’s characteristics, shows a 
positive and highly significant coefficient for all the airlines. This evidence suggests that 
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airport presence is an important factor in determining city pair profitability, and it is 
consistent with early literature (e.g. Berry 1992).  
 The most economically interesting are the market structure variables (firm dummies), 
and we focus the following discussion on marginal effects reported in table 4. Traditional 
entry models predict that a firm will enter a monopoly market instead of one in which faces 
competition, all else equal. Also, models of entry pre-emption would exacerbate such 
prediction. Consequently, coefficients of the market structure dummies that are statistically 
significant and negative can be interpreted in the light of the theories of entry and entry 
deterrence. Our results suggest evidence of a negative relationship between entry and rivals’ 
presence in most cases. However, the presence of American increases the profits of 
Continental and United Airlines. This latter evidence is consistent with the possibility of 
complementarity and spillover effects. 
 Now, looking at firm-pairs and at their estimated entry functions we can draw on 
several cases. First, whenever (coefficients) marginal effects of rival presence are either not 
statistically significant or statistically significant but very small in magnitude, it suggests 
evidence that entrant’s profits are not affected by rival’s incumbency; this in turn suggests 
evidence consistent with the possibility of soft price competition34 between the two firms 
under consideration (e.g. Southwest-American, Continental-US Airways, Southwest-
Northwest, United Air-Northwest, Delta-Continental).Intuitively, profits can be higher if in 
the second stage of the game competition is soft. Second, in cases where for a given firm pair 
only one firm affects negatively the rival’s profits, then this may probably provide evidence 
of vertical product differentiation (e.g. Northwest-American, Continental-Southwest, Delta-
Southwest, United Air-US Airways); the firm that lowers the entrant’s profits may be a 
tougher competitor. Marginal effects are reciprocally negative for American-non-Leaders, 
United Airlines-Delta Airlines and US Airways-Northwest. In addition, we note that the 
estimated entry function for Southwest reports 535 observations instead of the full sample of 
661 markets; that is, 126 observations are dropped because of perfect collinearity as when 
United Airlines is present in a route Southwest is never there. These results where firms 
reciprocally lower profits can be consistent with the possibility of market collusion (mutual 
forbearance driven by territory allocation); however, we cannot rule out alternative 
explanations which are mainly referred to the conventional effect of competition on profits. 
                                                          
34
 We interpret ‘soft’ price competition in the sense of Sutton (1991); that is, at comparable level of market 
concentration price-cost margins are higher. 
  
74 
 
The estimation of Equation (7) produces results35 reported in Table 5. We report only 
the marginal effects, because those are enough to understand entry competition. Market size 
appears positive and significant for American, Delta Airlines and Continental, whilst we have 
evidence of not significant marginal effects for the others airlines. We have evidence of 
negative and significant marginal effect for the variable Distance regarding American, 
Southwest, Continental, and non-leaders; in contrast, we have evidence of positive and 
significant marginal effect for Delta airlines. United Airlines and Northwest bring evidence 
of not significant marginal effects. There is evidence of significant and positive Tourist’s 
marginal effects for American, Delta Airlines, Southwest, US Airways, whereas a negative 
marginal effect for Northwest. The variable Two-hub brings evidence of being significant and 
negative for Southwest, Continental and non-leaders and not significant for the remaining 
airlines. For the variable One-hub we have evidence of significant and negative marginal 
effects for American, Delta Airlines, Southwest, Continental and non-leaders; whilst there is 
evidence of not significance for the other airlines.  
Furthermore, we observe, consistent with Table 4, own route network out of end 
points increases profits of the city pair market. Looking at the estimated marginal effects of 
rivals’ airport presence, it emerges evidence of negative impact on profits, in all except for 
three cases (American and US Airways for Continental’s entry function, and Southwest for 
US Airways’ entry function). Therefore, we have evidence that in most cases rival’s airport 
presence lowers firm’s profits. We interpret this as consistent with firms not deliberately 
increasing multimarket contact.  
Overall, from the two models there is evidence consistent with the theory of market 
collusion developed by Belleflamme and Block (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 We focus on marginal effects which, are indeed reported in table 4. 
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Table 3 – Model 1: Coefficients 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
 
American 
(2) 
 
Delta 
(3) 
 
Southwest 
(4) 
 
Continental 
(5) 
 
US 
(6) 
 
United 
(7) 
 
Northwest 
(8) 
 
Non-leaders 
 
        
 
        
 
        Constant -1.644*** -1.678*** -1.403*** -1.445*** -2.249*** -2.744*** -1.455*** -0.645** 
 
(0.317) (0.204) (0.205) (0.240) (0.240) (0.327) (0.251) (0.253) 
American  -0.343* -0.196 0.695*** -0.329 0.516** -0.352 -0.590*** 
 
 (0.191) (0.211) (0.288) (0.241) (0.227) (0.280) (0.171) 
Delta -0.448  -0.634 0.016 0.118 -1.037*** -0.510* --0.341 
 
(0.383)  (0.453) (0.196) (0.268) (0.282) (0.308) (0.277) 
Southwest 0.015 -0.097  -0.180 0.064 -0.234 -0.386* -0.348** 
 
(0.192) (0.178)  (0.204) (0.225) (0.196) (0.232) (0.172) 
Continental -0.037 -0.033 -0.660  -0.112 0.300 -0.337 -0.628* 
 
(0.399) (0.194) (0.467)  (0.298) (0.316) (0.291) (0.341) 
US Airways 0.246 -0.631** 0.322 0.016  -0.184 -0.610** -0.932*** 
 
(0.273) (0.308) (0.274) (0.246)  (0.259) (0.256) (0.217) 
United Airlines -0.855** -0.409**  0.079 -0.628**  -0.045 -0.615** 
 
(0.380) (0.204)  (0.271) (0.268)  (0.256) (0.267) 
Northwest -0.635 0.019 0.007 -1.006*** -0.651 -0.185  -0.549** 
 
(0.425) (0.247) (0.370) (0.389) (0.399) (0.286)  (0.233) 
Non-leaders -0.440** -0.226 -0.378* -0.221 -0.059 -0.086 0.273  
 
(0.187) (0.177) (0.206) (0.306) (0.249) (0.206) (0.284)  
Z 0.158*** 0.079*** 0.160*** 0.137*** 0.123*** 0.173*** 0.102*** 0.092*** 
 
(0.025) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) 
Market size 0.054** 0.042** -0.019 0.036* -0.027 0.013 -0.079 -0.029 
 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.074) (0.032) 
Distance -0.138* 0.155** -0.221**   -0.597*** -0.056 0.143 0.125 -0.173*** 
 
(0.082) (0.070) (0.091) (0.118) (0.099) (0.093) (0.097) (0.065) 
Tourist 0.475*** 0.541*** 0.337** 0.132 0.445** 0.301 -0.675*** 0.125 
 
(0.184) (0.172) (0.172) (0.205) (0.222) (0.214) (0.221) (0.135) 
Two-hub -0.256 0.038 -0.633** -0.557 0.714** 0.298 0.618* -0.388 
 
(0.280) (0.249) (0.315) (0.371) (0.317) (0.301) (0.323) (0.265) 
One-hub -0.882*** -0.409* -0.926*** -0.579** -0.041 -0.264 0.002 -0.350** 
 
(0.236) (0.209) (0.232) (0.246) (0.266) (0.256) (0.221) (0.147) 
 
 
Pseudo  ^` 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.42 
 
 
0.41 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.49 
 
 
0.45 
 
 
0.52 
 
 
0.26 
 
Observations 
 
661 
 
661 
 
535 
 
661 
 
661 
 
661 
 
661 
 
661 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 4 – Model 1: Marginal effects 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
 
American 
(2) 
 
Delta 
(3) 
 
SouthW 
(4) 
 
Cont. 
 
(5) 
 
US 
(6) 
 
United 
(7) 
 
NorthW 
(8) 
 
Non-leader 
 
        
American 
 
-0.055* -0.027 0.041** -0.02 0.024** -0.021 -0.142*** 
 
 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011) (0.02) (0.035) 
Delta 
-0.07 
 
-0.071* 0.001 0.007 -0.065*** -0.028 -0.085 
 (0.051) 
 
(0.036) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.062) 
Southwest 0.003 -0.015 
 
-0.01 0.004 -0.013 -0.02 -0.088** 
 (0.035) (0.027) 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.039) 
Continental 
-0.007 -0.005 -0.071** 
 
-0.006 0.018 -0.017 -0.138** 
 (0.069) (0.029) (0.035) 
 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.058) 
US Airways 0.048 -0.076*** 0.057 0.001 
 
-0.01 -0.029** -0.183*** 
 (0.058) (0.027) (0.054) (0.015) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.03) 
United Air. 
-0.107*** -0.056** 
 
0.005 -0.032*** 
 
-0.002 -0.133*** 
 
   (0.029) (0.024) 
 
(0.017) (0.011) 
 
(0.012) (0.042) 
Northwest 
-0.084** 0.003 0.001 -0.040*** -0.029** -0.01 
 
-0.121*** 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.056) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
 
(0.04) 
Non-leaders 
-0.085** -0.037 -0.054* -0.014 -0.004 -0.005 0.012 
 
 (0.038) (0.03) (0.028) (0.021) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
Z 0.028*** 0.012*** 0.024*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.025*** 
 
  (0.006)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Market size 0.012** 0.006** -0.003 0.002* -0.0002 0.0007 -0.004 -0.007 
 
   (0.005)    (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) 
Distance 
-0.025*    0.024** -0.033** -0.035*** -0.003 0.008 0.006 -0.047*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) 
Tourist 0.088** 0.088*** 0.052** 0.008 0.029* 0.017 -0.033*** 0.034 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.037) 
Two-hub 
-0.041 0.006 -0.071*** -0.024** 0.068 0.02 0.047 -0.094* 
 (0.041) (0.04) (0.025) (0.012) (0.042) (0.025) (0.033) (0.056) 
One-Hub 
-0.171*** -0.066* -0.153*** -0.038** -0.003 -0.015 0.000 -0.097** 
 (0.053) (0.036) (0.039) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.042) 
 
 
Pseudo ^ 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.42 
 
 
0.41 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.49 
 
 
0.45 
 
 
0.52 
 
 
0.26 
 
Observations 
 
661 661 535 661 661 661 661 661 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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Table 5 – Model 2: Marginal effects 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
 
    American 
(2) 
 
 Delta 
(3) 
 
SouthW 
(4) 
 
Cont. 
 
(5) 
 
US 
(6) 
 
United 
(7) 
 
NorthW 
(8) 
 
Non-leader 
         
         
         
nrt_1 0.059*** -0.002 -0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.015*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
nrt_2 0.005 0.017*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.006* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
nrt_3 -0.007** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
nrt_4 -0.009** 0.000 -0.004** 0.010*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) 
nrt_5 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.002** 0.011*** -0.002 0.001 -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
nrt_6 -0.012** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.014*** 0.002 -0.009** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
nrt_7 -0.008* -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.011*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
nrt_8 -0.032*** -0.008** -0.006*** 0.002 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.043*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Market size 0.018*** 0.004 0.0005 0.002 -0.0008 0.001 -0.006 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) 
Distance -0.024 0.025** -0.010** -0.035*** -0.004 0.001* 0.007 -0.038** 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) 
Tourist 0.036 0.088*** 0.012 0.017 0.024 0.01 -0.047*** -0.011 
 (0.044) (0.032) (0.01) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.041) 
Two-hub -0.056 0.037 -0.022** -0.033*** 0.002 0.019 -0.016 0.01 
 (0.061) (0.044) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.039) (0.024) (0.086) 
One-hub -0.127** -0.097** -0.040** -0.079** -0.034 -0.02 -0.053* 0.066 
 (0.063) (0.049) (0.019) (0.038) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032) (0.052) 
 
 
Pseudo ^` 
 
 
 
 0.54 
 
 
0.39 
 
 
0.52 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.41 
 
 
0.48 
 
 
0.29 
Observations 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This paper has the objective to gain insights on entry in airline city pair markets. Specific 
questions explored are identities of entrants, how market structure in terms of identities of 
existing firms affects entry, impact of own and rival’s airport presence on route profitability, 
whether there is evidence of market collusion. Similarly to Toivanen and Waterson (2005), 
we estimate firm-specific probit equations. We note that airlines, in various cases, differ in 
how they respond to market characteristics.  
 In addition to market characteristics as explanatory variables, our Model 1 of entry 
includes identities of existing firms. From these firm dummies we can explore generally as 
rival presence affects entry, and, in particular, we can investigate a form of collusive 
behaviour, territory allocation. In many cases, particularly for leader airlines, market structure 
reduces probability of entry in accordance with traditional theories of entry and entry 
deterrence. However, for some airlines it seems to be evidence of a positive relationship 
between entry and existing market structure. Whether this is caused by strategic 
complementarity, by learning or positive spillover effects, we cannot tell. Finally, 
interestingly, some firm-pairs show evidence consistent with the possibility of market 
collusion.  
 The second entry model we implement uses number of routes flown out of end points 
of each route in place of firm dummies. Firm’s own airport presence is always positive and 
significant; this confirms previous literature in constituting an important factor of airline city 
pair’s profitability. Also, we use a set of new variables capturing rivals’ airport presence, 
studying its impact on entry hence route profitability. A fairly clear pattern emerges from the 
results, showing in most cases a negative relationship between rivals’ airport presence and 
profits. This implies that where rival’s entry is more likely in a given city pair, firm’s profits 
are lower. 
 Overall, our results from the two models of entry do produce some evidence 
consistent with the possibility of the phenomenon studied theoretically by Belleflamme and 
Bloch (2004). However it is worth noting that the analysis proposed here does not rule out 
alternative explanations, as observed in the previous section.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this concluding chapter we sum up the results, their limitations, as well as considering 
some directions for future research. 
 
5.1 Summary of results 
In Chapter 2 we apply the bounds approach to concentration. We use stochastic frontier 
models to estimate the lower bound and the upper bound to concentration, producing the 
following results: i) evidence of a large and positive lower bound to concentration (non-
fragmentation); ii) evidence of a maximal level of concentration corresponding to monopoly, 
which results to be invariant to market size; iii) using the full set of firms, we document 
evidence that the airline industry is a natural oligopoly where in each city pair market the 
number of dominant firms is between one and three, regardless of market size. These three 
results suggest evidence that equilibrium market structure is driven by endogenous sunk costs 
competition. Our interpretation is that airlines escalate investments in advertising as well as 
investments for expanding route structure. In fact, the number of routes serviced out of the 
end points of a given city pair can enhance market shares within the given route market. We 
argue that these sunk costs are endogenous crucially at route level.  
In Chapter 3, we obtain the following findings: i) larger markets and large hub city 
pairs have evidence of greater number of firms, while longer routes have evidence of fewer 
airlines; ii) large hub markets and those with major airlines have evidence of more 
pronounced firm size inequality, consistent with tougher product market competition; iii) 
evidence of positive relationship between leader airlines and non-leaders which, appears to be 
consistent with learning: non-leader airlines deduce size and profitability of markets from 
observing behaviour of leaders. Moreover, we discuss alternative potential explanations 
which, we succeed to rule out.  
In Chapter 4 we attempt to provide evidence if firms behave collusively in dividing 
markets with the goal to prevent competition head-to-head. Results suggest evidence 
consistent with the possibility of market collusion. 
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5.2 Limitations 
The empirical analysis of market structure and competition of the airline industry provided in 
this dissertation has three kinds of limitations. 
 
An Alternative Explanation 
Econometric tests provided on the ESC model may be interpreted appealing to alternative 
mechanisms. In fact, forces and influences on market structure of this industry may be 
explained by entry deterrence strategies, though these include endogenous sunk costs 
escalation. A detailed industry history about the evolution of advertising expenditures and 
investments on expanding routes flown out of end points constituting a city pair will strongly 
reinforce the econometric evidence. However, there is anecdotal evidence that U.S. airlines 
have established and continuously expanded hub and spoke network since deregulation. This 
implies that firms have increased routes flown out of origin/destination of city pair markets. 
 
A Contradictory Result 
In Chapter 4 we found that profits of non-leader airlines decline when there is presence of the 
majors. These results of the nature of competition between the non-leaders and the leaders 
contradict evidence provided in Chapter 3 of a positive relation between the two groups of 
firms. An explanation for this discrepancy is as follows: in Figure 1 below we provide a fitted 
line of a non-parametric regression about the relationship between number of leaders and 
number of non-leaders. There is evidence that moving from markets with only non-leaders to 
those markets having at least one leader the number of non-leaders declines, while for 
markets with at least on leader the number of non-leaders increases as the number of leaders 
does. As in Chapter 3 we wanted to study the effect on non-leaders entry of presence of 
leaders, we obtain evidence of a positive relationship as suggested here by the Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Relationship between leaders  
and non-leaders 
 
 
Further Evidence 
The specific research question which was addressed in Chapter 4, was to test whether firms 
carve out route markets to prevent competition head-to-head. The two econometric entry 
models proposed although produce fairly clear results consistent with this collusive behaviour, 
there may be other forces causing these results. Consequently, the benefit of an industry 
history on the evolution of how major airlines have developed their route networks and if 
they have deliberately established little overlap on their territory coverage will be 
considerable.  
 
5.3 Directions for Future Research 
Given the limitations considered in the previous section, one natural direction of future 
research is to extend the work in Chapter 4 by developing an industry history to discern 
whether major airlines have developed over time their route structure in such a way to create 
little overlap; therefore preventing competition head-to-head. If so, it would complement and 
reinforce the econometric evidence we currently provide.   
Another potential fruitful plan relates to perform an empirical analysis of market 
sharing agreements in others industries. In some real world market situations firms operating 
in multimarket industries may be able to coordinate entry in local markets, in such a way of 
determining local monopolies in which, thus, firms gain monopoly profits preventing 
competition head to head. The way through which firms may achieve this, is a sort of 
collusion strategy. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are several antitrust cases involving this type of 
‘market’ collusion both in the US, under the Sherman Act for example, and in Europe. A 
further real world situation, which can provoke speculative thoughts, is provided by Sutton’s 
(1998) analysis of intensive R&D industries. For instance, the pharmaceutical industry at 
global level exhibits low concentration despite the fact that two sorts of endogenous sunk 
costs are prominent, advertising and R&D. In contrast, at more local level the industry shows 
high concentration within a given product market. This discrepancy in structure is explained 
by Sutton as a consequence of firms’ segmentation and specialisations (Sutton calls these as 
‘technological trajectories’), say, in some drug therapy. In other words, firms, given different 
technological characteristics, may tend to specialise in different technological trajectories 
giving, thus, scope to development of niche product markets, overall resulting in a fairly 
fragmented structure at global level but very concentrated at more local market level. This 
kind of behaviour may be the fruit of coordinated strategies. 
The project would be based on a cross-industry analysis for a sample of EC 
prosecuted cartels studying which factors determine territory allocation as alternative to price 
fixing. The research would address the following questions; Are there any industry specific 
factors increasing the likelihood of this form of collusion? In homogeneous good industries 
agreements on markets can reduce probability of emergence of price wars in context of 
pronounced demand uncertainty, what about industries with differentiated products? Is this 
type of collusion as common in differentiated product industries as in homogeneous product 
industries?  
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